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Chapter 1
Introduction
3.5 to 1.5 million years ago, predecessors of mankind started to walk upright, eat
meat and trade. In this era, food was traded in hope of getting back goods and
commodities in the future or to win other mens' and womens' favor. Then, in the
Upper Paleolithic (45,000-10,000 years B.C.), labor division started and goods were
traded against goods (Alfred, 2011, p. 243ﬀ.). Already then, the concept of a price
emerged in the form of terms of trade in a barter, and later on with the introduction
of money.
Today, a more or less consistent view of what role prices play has evolved. Fried-
man (1988) summarizes as follows: First, prices have an information function. Prices
transmit information on preferences, production possibilities and availability of re-
sources, thereby coordinating market participants and clearing the market. Second,
they have an allocation function. Prices provide an incentive for individuals to search
for the cheapest way of producing goods and using resources where their utility is
highest. Third, they have a distribution function. When a good is produced and
consumed, a rent is created. Prices deﬁne the share of this rent each individual in-
volved in this process gets. However, in the history of economic thought, it has been
a long road until the importance of prices for markets and economies has become
that clear.
1.1 A short history of prices
The earliest surviving comments on prices originate from Platon and Aristotle (5th
and 4th century B.C., respectively). While Platon only stated that one should not
price discriminate between customers, Aristotle distinguished between the value in
use and the value in exchange of a product. The latter could be higher than the
value in use and is supposed to be determined by "proportionality" of the traders.
Hence, a higher status trader is allowed to charge a higher price (Schefold, 1994, p.
113ﬀ.). In the 13th century, theologian Thomas Aquinas developed the concept of
a "just price", which compensates the seller for his individual cost, but not more.
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This price is god-made and hence higher prices are unjust. In the 14th and 15th
century, this concept was modiﬁed. Johannes Buridanus was the ﬁrst to argue that
not individual, but collective supply and demand determine the price of a good.
Furthermore, Antonin of Florence argued that prices not only reﬂect utility, but
also rarity and subjective value of a good. Hence, building on Aquinas, they argued
that there could exist a range of prices from just to unjust ones (Schinzinger, 2002).
In the 16th and 17th century, not much new was added to price theory until
in the 18th century classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo
successively introduced their labor theory of value (prices). They argued that the
"natural" (long-run) price of a good can be derived by adding up the amounts
of labor directly and indirectly (through the accumulation of capital) used in its
production. Prices can vary around this "natural price" due to market power of the
sellers (e.g., monopolies) or due to a mismatch of supply and demand (Schefold &
Carstensen, 2002).1
In the 19th century, with the "Marginal Revolution", authors such as William
Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, Léon Walras and Alfred Marshall shifted the focus
towards marginal utility (Niehans, 1994). In their theory, prices do not reﬂect the
imputed labor, but the marginal utility of the last unit traded. Producers will stop
oﬀering more units of a good, as soon as marginal cost of production are higher than
the marginal consumer is willing to pay. Consequently, Jevons (1871) argued that
in a market with perfect competition and no transaction cost, taxes, etc., there can
only exist one price.2 Using this concept of marginal utility, since then, contributions
of price theory and industrial economics have been concerned with explaining price
formation under more general assumptions and looked at situations of market power,
market failure, incomplete information or state interventions (see, e.g., Weber, 2012
for a detailed overview).
1.2 Outline of the thesis
This thesis looks at prices in two diﬀerent markets. The ﬁrst one is the market for
food products in Europe. With the introduction of the common market in 1992, most
European markets have been integrated. When 10 more countries joined the EU in
2004, another round of integration took place and the common market was extended
to these countries as well. Chapter 2 analyses if retail prices for food products have
converged in the time after this "shock" of the EU enlargement.3 While there exists
1Adam Smith only acknowledges that the demand depends on the price, but not the other way
round.
2This idea has further been developed to the purchasing power parity by Cassel (1918).
3Chapter 2 is based on a joint project with Switgard Feuerstein (Lindenblatt & Feuerstein,
2015). Both authors contributed to these papers in equal shares to the design, execution, data
analysis and writing. In this paper I have an above average stake in the programming work to create
and to clean the dataset as well as to implement the statistical analysis. The Copyright of this
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an extensive literature on convergence in general, this chapter is the ﬁrst to be able
to look at retail price convergence within the European Union at a micro-data level.
By decomposing price convergence into within sub-groups and between sub-groups
of countries convergence, we add further insight to the literature on what causes
the strong price convergence within the enlarged EU. In future research it might be
interesting to look at a longer time horizon and to include products of other sectors
into the analysis.
The second market this thesis looks at is the one for internet facilitated sexual
services in Germany. Sex work and the advertisement thereof is legal in Germany,
which has led to a range of internet platforms concerned with selling sexual ser-
vices. While many platforms only contain advertisements, one of these platforms 
www.gesext.de  gives sex workers the opportunity to sell their services either as an
auction or at a ﬁxed price. This has allowed us to create a dataset on sex work with
information based on actual concluded contracts, which is a very unique feature in
this kind of literature. Furthermore, each data point is geo- and time-referenced.
This dataset is used to show that 1) oﬀering unprotected sexual services is endoge-
nous, 2) local events inﬂuence the supply, demand and price of sexual services, and
3) regional eﬀects inﬂuence local prices and habits.4
In writing these three chapters we have focused on basic research questions that
had still not been suﬃciently answered in the given literature, but the richness of
this dataset allows for several future research projects. First, one might look at how
the decision to bid on a sex worker depends on customers' preferences. Second, sex
workers are repeatedly observed and it will be interesting to look at the dynamics
of how sex workers react to competition and information gathered from their (or
others') earlier contracts. Third, there are hardly any datasets on goods or services
whatsoever that contain repeated observations both on the seller and on the buyer
side of both sold and unsold oﬀers (supply) as well as winning and loosing bids
(demand). Most datasets only include market prices of sold goods. With this
kind of information demand curves can be created and price elasticities calculated.
Furthermore, the concept of a hedonic price regression, which in its normal form only
includes market prices (where supply and demand are matched), can be improved
by including unmatched demand and supply.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. The next paragraphs give a short
overview of the ﬁve main chapters, which are followed by the chapters themselves.
These ﬁve chapters can be read independently from each other, but share a common
article lies with the Oxford Journals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbu038
4The three articles that the chapters 46 are based on are co-authored by Peter Egger (Eg-
ger & Lindenblatt, 2015a,b,c). Both authors contributed to these papers in equal shares to the
design, execution, data analysis and writing. In these papers I have an above average stake in
the programming work to create and to clean the dataset as well as to implement the statistical
analysis. The Copyright of Egger & Lindenblatt (2015a) lies with the Springer publishing group
Berlin-Heidelberg, DOI: 10.1007/s10198-014-0640-2
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bibliography and appendix.
Chapter 2: Price convergence after the Eastern enlargement
of the EU: Evidence from retail food prices
In chapter 2 ﬁndings on food price convergence in Europe after the enlargement
of 2004 are presented. Since the single market was introduced in 1992, there has
always been the expectation for prices to converge. However, two decades and many
studies later, it has become clear that prices continue to diﬀer. On the one hand,
higher competition, converging labor cost and the lack of trade barriers should close
the gap between prices of identical goods in European countries. On the other hand,
if retailers provide value adding services to customers or if their preferences diﬀer
from country to country, price diﬀerences may persist in competitive markets.
From a statistical point of view, these two opposing forces translate into mean
reversion decreasing all price diﬀerences by a certain percentage and random shocks
on individual price diﬀerences increasing them again. In the earlier convergence
literature, price convergence was measured by looking at the size of mean reversion
(β-convergence). However, as random shocks can increase prices again, mean re-
version is only a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for price convergence. In
contrast, the concept of σ-convergence looks at the change of the variance and hence
also includes random shocks increasing prices again. In the long-run, the two coun-
tervailing eﬀects balance out and price dispersion reaches a steady state. Only if this
state has not yet been reached, or if an external shock changes it, price convergence
will be observed. The enlargement round of the EU in 2004 might constitute such a
shock. At that time, eight Central and Eastern European member states (as well as
Malta and Cyprus) have joined the European Union, markets have been liberalized
and trade barriers have fallen.
To analyse if prices converged after the enlargement in 2004, a unique dataset
on European retail food prices is used - both at the level of individual products as
well as at a semi-aggregate level for EU15 and all eight Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean accession countries (EU8). In line with the new convergence literature, we
test for σ-convergence and ﬁnd that from 2001-2003, the period before the acces-
sion, prices diverged within EU23. In contrast, there was strong price convergence
from 2003-2006 and 2006-2009.5 When price convergence is decomposed into within
and between sub-groups convergence, we ﬁnd that it is dominated by convergence
between EU8's and EU15's prices and not prices within each of these two subgroups.
5Micro-level data is not available for every year, but only for the years mentioned here.
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Chapter 3: Sex work: An introduction and a new dataset
Chapter 3 gives some background on sex work in Germany and introduces the
full www.gesext.de dataset as well as its descriptive statistics. The chapter ﬁrst gives
a historical overview on sex work in ancient Europe and especially modern times
Germany. Until recently, sex work in Germany was in a legal gray area and only
with the introduction of a new legal framework in 2002, the legal status has been
completely clariﬁed. In comparison to other European countries, the German laws
are very progressive. Sex workers' rights have been put on par with workers' rights
in other sectors, while still keeping forced prostitution and human traﬃcking illegal
(Kavemann & Steﬀan, 2013).
Against this background of sex work being legal in some countries and illegal in
other ones, existing theories on sex work are discussed. These theories basically ex-
plain three features of the market. First, the existence of a price-premium between
sex workers and non-sex workers, is explained by the opportunity cost for encoun-
tering higher risk of violence and social stigma. Second, price premia between sex
workers for certain types of sexual services can again be explained as compensation
for risk-taking or higher opportunity cost (e.g., oﬀering unprotected sex and hence
encountering a higher risk of catching a sexually transmitted disease). Third, the
decision of a sex worker to enter the market is discussed.
Furthermore, existing datasets for the market for sexual services are presented.
These are mainly survey based and for developing countries. None of them contains
micro-level data for Germany. In this way, our German dataset, which is extracted
from www.gesext.de, is unique: it consists of contract data for a developed country.
As in chapters 4  6 sub-samples of this dataset are used, we explain in detail
how this dataset was generated and present the descriptive statistics of its variables.
On this platform, sellers can advertise sexual services and either oﬀer them as an
auction or at a ﬁxed price. Using a self-written script, we downloaded all sexual
service oﬀerings posted on "www.gesext.de" from January, 16 in 2011 to September,
9 in 2012. In total female suppliers posted 102, 096 oﬀerings, of which 33% were
sold. All sellers together made 6.2 million Euro or on average 103 Euro per hour
during this time period. During the following year, the information contained in this
dataset was extracted partly by pattern recognition software and partly by students
categorizing the information. Additionally to the information on oﬀered services
as well as seller- and buyer-identiﬁers, the key features of the dataset are regional-
and time-identiﬁers. These allow us to merge the dataset with information on the
socio-demographics of the population living in a given region and events that took
place in the same region at a given time. After describing the variables and their
descriptive statistics in detail, the chapter compares some selected statistics over
regions.
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Chapter 4: Endogenous risk taking and physical appearance
of sex workers
A key issue in sex work is health protection. Chapter 4 looks at risk (price)
premia due to oﬀering unprotected sexual services. In our dataset, a considerable
share of sexual services are provided without a condom (6%), which is consistent
with previous work (Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005; Robinson et al., 2011;
Arunachalam & Shah, 2013). Thereby both the sex worker and its client are endan-
gered of catching a sexually transmitted disease (STD). As Cunningham & Kendall
(2011b) argue, this share is likely to be even higher in the oine part of the market,
as sex workers there tend to be less educated and engage in more risk-taking.
In studies that do not control for endogeneity of risk-taking, the estimates of
price premia thereof range between 9% in Kenya (Robinson et al., 2011) and 30% in
Mexico (de la Torre et al., 2010). The only study that does control for endogeneity
estimates the price premium to be in India in 1993 as high as 194% − 376% (Rao
et al., 2003). Several studies show that the likelihood that sex workers take this risk
is endogenous and depends on many factors such as the price premium or the sex
worker's attractiveness (Gertler et al., 2005; Chang & Weng, 2012). However, these
studies do not control for the resulting endogeneity when estimating price premia.
Based on an instrumental variable approach, our results suggest that the in-
centive (price premium) for risk-taking is about twice as high when accounting for
endogeneity than when assuming random assignment of risk-taking. When a service
is oﬀered without protection, the seller earns a premium of 91%. The estimate is
lower than the estimate in Rao et al. (2003), but this might be due to the fact that
Rao et al. look at a developing country and an earlier time span (1993), with less
access to HIV and other medication than in Germany today. Within regions, we ﬁnd
some spill overs, resulting in a higher likelihood to oﬀer unprotected services if other
sellers oﬀer them as well. In contrast to previous work, we do not ﬁnd any evidence
for overweight sex workers receiving a lower price premium than non-overweight sex
workers. These results are relevant from a policy perspective as they clearly show
that 1) there is an incentive to oﬀer unprotected sexual services and this incentive is
even higher than when not controlling for endogeneity, and 2) this incentive depends
on practices of other local sex workers.
Chapter 5: Fun and games: How soccer games and conventions
raise the demand for paid sex
In chapter 5 we look at one speciﬁc aspect of large events: how shocks on the
demand side inﬂuences the market for sexual services. The literature on the eco-
nomic eﬀects of events in general comes to mixed conclusions whether hosting these
events pays oﬀ in economic terms. While large sport events tend to have no or a
6
negative impact on economic well-being (e.g., Allmers & Maennig, 2009; Baade &
Matheson, 2004; Hagn & Maennig, 2009; Feddersen & Maennig, 2012), there is some
evidence that trade fairs increase economic growth (e.g., Tourism Vancouver, 2007;
Penzkofer, 2008; Bathelt & Spigel, 2012). What has however become clear in the
literature is that the price as well as the supply of sexual services react to market
forces such as the size of supply and demand (Moﬀatt & Peters, 2004; Della Giusta
et al., 2008, 2009a; Cunningham, 2011).
Our newly created dataset (see above) includes geo- and time-references for ev-
ery individual transaction, which can be used to match the services oﬀered and
purchased with event information. Namely, we merge our dataset with information
on national league soccer games, European Championship games and trade shows.
This allows us to analyze how these three types of events inﬂuence supply, demand,
and prices in the region at the time an event takes place, as well as in its neighboring
regions.
Employing Poisson quasi-maximum-likelihood estimators, we provide evidence
that events are relatively important. Ongoing soccer game (German league or Eu-
ropean Championship) and trade fair events raise the number of sellers and buyers
(extensive margin) as well as contracted services in the respective region by a high
two-digit percentage. The same is true for neighboring regions. Furthermore, there
is also an eﬀect on the intensive margin: on event days, sellers oﬀer more services per
day and buyers bid more often. If all events are combined and both direct (within
region) and indirect eﬀects (on neighboring regions) are included, this rise is in the
high two-digit percentage range. Furthermore, there are also eﬀects on prices, which
are smaller and, for soccer events, depend on whether events happen locally (home
games versus away games), and how the local team fares (looses or wins). Overall,
we estimate moderate price eﬀects of, e.g., 3%− 5% for auctions.
Chapter 6: The long shadow of the iron curtain for female sex
workers in German cities: Border eﬀects and regional diﬀer-
ences
The last chapter of this thesis provides evidence on regional diﬀerences within
Germany in the market for sexual services. In the social sciences, it has become
clear that regional economic and social conditions inﬂuence sex workers' decisions.
First, local authorities and citizens determine moral and ethical norms and deﬁne
what in their region is accepted and what it forbidden (Hubbard, 2001; Hubbard
& Sanders, 2003; Hubbard & Whowell, 2008). Second, regions diﬀer in their social
organization, i.e., in how these norms can be enforced (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).
Third, in the sexual ﬁelds theory it is argued that individual desires aggregate to a
ﬁeld of geographical scope with gravitational forces (Green, 2008, 2011). All three
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arguments lead to individuals' desires being inﬂuenced by the attitudes of the region
they live in and to individuals moving to regions that ﬁt their desires.
In Germany, regional diﬀerences in the market for sexual services originate from
several sources. Before the reuniﬁcation in 1990, oﬀering sexual services was for-
bidden in Eastern Germany and in a legal gray area in Western Germany. It was
existent in both parts of Germany (the State security service, Stasi, even used sex
workers to acquire secrets from the West), but while in the East sex workers saw it
as a way to earn Deutschmarks and get access to a life in luxury, in the West it was
seen as a last resort to make money. With the reuniﬁcation, the West-German code
of law was also introduced in the former Eastern states. Until 2002, oﬀering sexual
services remained in a legal gray area (see section 3.1) and since then oﬀering sexual
services is completely legal. However, regional diﬀerences still exist as sex work is
still policed and taxed on a local level. Furthermore, moral attitudes only change
gradually and diﬀerences between regions and especially between the former East
and the former West still exist (e.g., see Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007).
The empirical part of chapter 6 alludes to a regional pattern, in particular, in
pricing. This pattern varies with the size of cities and across as well as along the
former East-West German border. In particular, the evidence from a regression
discontinuity design (RDD) suggests that there is a long shadow of the former Iron
Curtain which leads to higher conditional prices in the former East than in the
West, and especially, in larger agglomerations such as Berlin. Moreover, there is
evidence of habit formation and spillovers within regions which lead to regionally
clustered prices as well as unprotected services oﬀerings by sexual workers. This is in
favor of the theories mentioned above, arguing regions have an eﬀect on individuals'
behavior due to the existence of certain norms and their enforcement through, e.g.,
social ﬁelds.
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Chapter 2
Price convergence after the Eastern
enlargement of the EU:
evidence from retail food prices
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the eﬀect of the EU enlargement in 2004 on food price con-
vergence. Using comprehensive Eurostat data1, it is the ﬁrst study looking at price
convergence of retail prices at a disaggregate level, both for the old member states
(EU15) and the eight new Central and Eastern European member states (EU8).
The data allows us to look at price convergence for a time period that includes more
than just the initial eﬀects right after the EU enlargement.
Within the single market of the European Union, large price diﬀerences for iden-
tical products are well documented, which can only partly be explained by cost
diﬀerences or by diﬀering overall price levels. In general, it was expected that
these price diﬀerences decrease over time, as ongoing market integration amounts to
convergence of prices. There are, however, also reasons why price diﬀerences may
persist and need not disappear. Especially in the retail sector, price diﬀerences for
individual products are feasible even in competitive markets. If retailing gives a
value-adding service to consumers, arbitrage will not take place. After some ad-
justment, a constant level of price dispersion may be reached. Price convergence
will only be observed if either this steady state has not been reached yet, or if an
external shock has lead to a new steady state with lower price dispersion.
The Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 is likely to be such an external
shock, but it remains an empirical question, if this shock has actually induced price
convergence. The results are of political relevance, as (Dreger et al., 2008, p.66) point
out that, "price convergence facilitates the working of common economic policies".
In this context, the food market is particularly interesting. While in most sectors,
1We thank Paul Konijn of Eurostat for providing us with the data.
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trade liberalization took place gradually over the whole decade before the accession,
the agricultural sector was only liberalized in 2004.
Until the 1990s, price convergence was thought of as β-convergence (mean re-
version), which is found in virtually all studies on European prices. However, in the
recent literature it has been widely discussed that β-convergence is not suﬃcient for
price convergence in the sense of a decreasing price dispersion between countries.
It is possible to observe signiﬁcant mean reversion, while the variance of prices in-
creases due to ongoing random shocks on prices. Hence, it is necessary to examine
σ-convergence, which is deﬁned as a decrease of the variance over time (Barro &
Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Carree & Klomp, 1997). This point is further discussed in sec-
tion 2.4. Applying a test for σ-convergence by Egger & Pfaﬀermayr (2009), we ﬁnd
price divergence within the European Union as a whole in the lead-up to accession,
but price convergence thereafter. Furthermore, we decompose the variance of prices
and conclude that price convergence within the EU as a whole is partly driven by
the dynamics within EU8, but the main eﬀect is convergence between EU8's and
EU15's prices.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a short overview of the
literature. In sections 2.3 and 2.4, we present the data and the method used. Section
2.5 looks at σ-convergence as well as its decomposition and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Retailing, the EU and price convergence
According to the law of one price (LOOP), on a perfectly integrated market a good
will only have one price. When the European Single Market was introduced in 1992,
it was therefore widely expected that prices would converge within the European
Union and that price diﬀerences between member countries would merely reﬂect
remaining cost diﬀerences, such as transport costs or diﬀering value added taxes
(Cecchini et al., 1988). Similar expectations emerged when the European Monetary
Union (EMU) started (European Commission, 1990).
There are, however, also reasons why price diﬀerences are observed and may
persist over time. Retail prices do not only include production costs or import
prices, but also retailing costs, which to a large extent reﬂect labour costs, and
proﬁt margins. Price diﬀerences for identical products are feasible as long as they
do not exceed arbitrage costs (which may well be higher than mere transportation
costs). Taking into account that retailing gives a value-adding service to consumers,
arbitrage will hardly take place at the level of retailing and price diﬀerences may
persist over time even when all trade barriers have been removed.
Price levels are in general lower in countries with a low per capita income. The
accession of the Central and Eastern European transition countries, which have
low price levels, has increased price dispersion within the EU. Dreger et al. (2008)
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emphasize two countervailing eﬀects on the price level indices of these countries.
The integration into the internal market will increase competition and thereby lower
prices, while the process of catching up increases prices due to the Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect, i.e., due to rising wages. When the second eﬀect dominates, rising labour costs
lead to rising prices. Price diﬀerences within the EU become smaller and thus price
convergence is observed.
However, price patterns are much more complex than just some countries having
high prices and other countries having low prices. Relative prices of pairs of goods
also vary a lot among the member states of the EU, with individual products being
relatively expensive in some countries and relatively cheap in others (see section
2.3). Such price diﬀerences may reﬂect diﬀerent mark-ups for the same product
in diﬀerent countries, thus they might emerge from price setting behaviour in the
retail sector. Bliss (1988) develops a theory of retail pricing and suggests that mark-
ups to cover overhead-costs will be set according to Ramsey-taxation rules, leading
to higher mark-ups for goods with a lower elasticity of demand. Consequently,
retail prices for individual products will vary within a group of countries as long as
demand patterns  and therefore elasticities of demand  diﬀer, even in competitive
markets. Such diﬀerences in product-speciﬁc proﬁt margins can explain long-run
price diﬀerences for individual products. MacDonald & Ricci (2005) discuss the
eﬀect of the distribution sector in the context of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP),
albeit at a highly aggregate level. There are thus forces reducing price diﬀerences
in integrated markets, but also reasons for long-run price diﬀerences.
This idea translates into a statistical process of convergence with two countervail-
ing eﬀects: First, mean reverting forces generally lower all price diﬀerences between
two points in time. Second, random shocks on individual prices increase price dis-
persion.2 These countervailing eﬀects eventually balance, and a constant level of
price dispersion will be reached. Hence, price convergence is observed if the initial
variance of prices is larger than in this long-run steady state. This might be the
case if a given long-run steady state has not yet been reached or if an external shock
has changed the long-run steady state. Whether prices converge in a given situation
is thus an empirical question (see Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Carree & Klomp,
1997; Egger & Pfaﬀermayr, 2009).
Empirical studies show that the law of one price does not hold within the Eu-
ropean Union. Large price diﬀerences for identical products are observed, which
are not just due to cost diﬀerences (see, e.g., Cumby, 1996 for Big Mac Hamburg-
ers, Haskel & Wolf, 2001 for prices of IKEA, a furniture retailer, and Goldberg &
Verboven, 2004 for cars). In view of these price diﬀerences, several studies looked
at σ-convergence of retail prices within the European Union. Egger et al. (2009)
2If one only looks at two points in time (as in the test by Egger & Pfaﬀermayr, 2009, which we
use in this chapter), these random shocks also include reasons for permanent price diﬀerences of
individual products (emerging, e.g., from varying demand structures as in Bliss, 1988; see above).
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ﬁnd some signiﬁcant σ-convergence for tradeable but not for non-tradeable goods
for EU12 in the time period when the internal market was introduced (1990 - 1996).
Wolszczak-Derlacz & De Blander (2009) reject price convergence within EU15 and
three selected new member-states in the following ten years from 1995 - 2005, and
Parsley & Wei (2008) do not ﬁnd price convergence for Big Macs during the time of
the Euro changeover within the countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
For the same time period (1995 - 2005), Fischer (2012) ﬁnds large variation of the
prices of washing machines and even price divergence within EU15. Moreover, EMU
seems to have had no eﬀect on price convergence. Only two studies have data avail-
able for all new member states of the European Union, both using data until 2005.
While Funke & Koske (2008) only look at mean reversion and not at σ-convergence,
Dreger et al. (2008) ﬁnd small (initial) eﬀects of the EU enlargement on convergence.
On the whole, the literature provides hardly any evidence of price convergence on
a disaggregate level within the EU. However, the Eastern European enlargement
in 2004 constitutes an especially large shock, shifting the long run equilibrium of
price dispersion and hence creating potential for price convergence. This particu-
larly applies for food prices, as in contrast to many other markets liberalization of
this market indeed took place mainly at the date of accession.
Our chapter expands the existing literature in several dimensions. By covering
the EU15 and all Central and Eastern European countries, which acceded the EU in
2004, as well as extending the period considered until 2009, it accounts for the full
magnitude of the enlargement shock. It includes not only initial, but also medium-
term eﬀects on prices. Moreover, the analysis uses disaggregate data. We can thus
study comprehensively, whether or not after the external shock of Eastern enlarge-
ment, retail food price convergence has taken place within the new EU. Moreover,
we decompose convergence into within and between subgroups convergence.
2.3 The data
In the framework of the Eurostat-OECD Purchasing Power Parity Program, retail
prices for more than 400 narrowly deﬁned food products are collected every three
years (e.g., "fresh milk, unskimmed, 1 liter, well known brand"). For every prod-
uct, employees of the respective national statistical bureau collect prices at 15-20
diﬀerent outlets ignoring short term price reductions such as promotional oﬀers.3
Each national statistical bureaus then adjusts these prices for spatial and seasonal
eﬀects (e.g., for fruit, ﬁsh, etc.) and weights them such that for the given product
the average price reﬂects the national shopping pattern (with regard to the diﬀer-
ent types of outlets). As prices are reported in their national currencies, they are
converted into euro with the oﬃcial Eurostat exchange rate for the given year. The
3For speciﬁed brands, the price is collected in 5-10 outlets.
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data is available for the three waves 2003, 2006 and 2009 and shows that there are
large price diﬀerences for identical products within the EU, and also within EU15
(Eurostat, 2010). Unfortunately, not all products can be traced over time, as the
set of products has somewhat changed. Moreover, countries only collect prices that
they consider relevant, meaning that not all countries report all prices, which results
in missing data. Matching the products of these three waves, we have compiled a
data set of 147 products. For a more detailed description of the data see Eurostat
(2007).
Eurostat also provides the data at a semi-aggregate level of 34 product group
price level indices (also called "basic headings", e.g., fresh milk, pasta), and there
are good reasons to analyse data at this level as well. In contrast to the individual
products, there are observations for all countries for every product group and prob-
lems of missing data do not occur. Moreover, the price level indices are available
for a longer time period (1995-2009 for EU15 and 2001-2009 for EU25), allowing us
to consider price dispersion also in the period before accession. Hence, in section
2.5 the analysis of price convergence is conducted both at the level of individual
products and at the level of the product groups.4
In the following analysis, we distinguish between three groups of countries. (i)
the old member countries EU15, (ii) the Central and Eastern European countries
EU8, which accessed the EU in 2004, and (iii) these two groups together as EU23.5
Since Bulgaria and Romania only joined in 2007 and data is not available before
2006, these two countries are left out. Moreover, we omit Malta and Cyprus. Their
situation as small island states is hardly comparable to the EU8.
Starting at the highest level of aggregation  the comparative price level index
food and non-alcoholic beverages (CPLI food)  large price level index diﬀerences
within EU23 are observed (Figure 2.1). With Poland as the cheapest country within
EU23 (64% of the EU27 average) and Denmark as the most expensive one (145%),
the diﬀerence in price level indices is more than 100%. It may be no surprise
that price level indices vary substantially within the European Union of 23, as the
new members just recently joined the EU. But even when we only consider EU15
countries, the price level indices diﬀer from 96% of the EU27 average in Portugal to
145% in Denmark.
Although Denmark on the whole has the highest prices for food, there are also
some food products that cost less than the EU27 average in Denmark and the
Danish price level indices of the 34 product groups range from 81% for rice to 216%
for mineral waters (EU27=100%). In Poland, the cheapest country, rice costs as
much as in Denmark, i.e., 81% of the EU27 average. In contrast, rice costs 125
4Other papers on price convergence, which are based on data from the Eurostat OECD PPP
program, look at the product group level (e.g., Egger et al., 2009) or an even more aggregate level
(e.g., Dreger et al., 2008). They do not use individual product prices.
5One other group that comes directly to mind are the EMU countries. We do not report results
for this subgroup as these do not diﬀer from EU15.
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Figure 2.1: Comparative price level index food and non alcoholic beverages 2009.
The graph presents the CPLI food with the EU27 average being normalized to 100%.
Source: Eurostat data, own representation.
Figure 2.2: Price level indices of selected product groups and countries, 2009.
The graph presents the PLI of some selected product groups and countries. The respective EU27
average has been normalized to 100%. The black bar depicts the CPLI food of the respective
country. Source: Eurostat data, own representation.
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% of the EU27 average in Slovenia, where the CPLI food is below 100%. Figure
2.2 illustrates this variety showing the price level indices of some selected product
groups and countries as well as their CPLI food.
Similar patterns arise when individual products within a product group are con-
sidered. Even when taking country-product group-speciﬁc eﬀects into account, con-
siderable unexplained price diﬀerences remain at the individual product level. For
many individual products, prices (measured relatively to the European average of
this product) are well above or well below the price level index of the respective
product group in that country. Within the product group "rice" individual prices
vary for example from 74% - 84% of the EU27 average in Poland, 99% - 147% in
Slovenia and 71 - 121 % in Denmark. Thus retail price diﬀerences are much more
complex than just countries being expensive or cheap on the whole, and price con-
vergence must be considered at a disaggregate level. Moreover, these price patterns
imply that price convergence may depend on the level of aggregation. It is possible
that prices converge at the level of individual products but diverge at the aggregate
level of product groups (and vice versa). As mentioned above, the Danish prices for
the diﬀerent kinds of rice vary from 71% to 121% of the EU27 average, with a prod-
uct group price level index for rice of 81%. If the 121%-price falls, this contributes
to convergence at the product level but to divergence for the product group rice.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Measuring convergence
In the literature, two diﬀerent approaches to measure price convergence over time
are used. The concept of β-convergence refers to mean reversion. It measures the
forces that make deviations from a uniform price  caused by a one-time initial
shock  fade out over time. In contrast, σ-convergence measures if the variance of
prices within a group of countries becomes smaller over time (Barro & Sala-i-Martin,
1995). The latter concept takes into account, that there are two opposing eﬀects:
mean reversion generally reduces all price deviations, but ongoing random shocks on
individual prices increase price dispersion again. Eventually a long-run steady state
is reached, where these two forces balance out and the variance of prices remains
constant over time. Price convergence (divergence) will be observed if the initial
price dispersion exceeds (is below) the long run steady state value. In this case,
mean reversion is strong enough (not strong enough) to dominate the dispersion
induced by these ongoing additional random shocks. Thus, mean reversion is only
a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for price convergence.
To analyse σ-convergence, we apply a Wald-test proposed by Egger & Pfaﬀer-
mayr (2009), which tests whether the variance has declined between two points in
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time, t0 and t1.6 The advantage of this test is that it neither needs long time-spans
or high frequency data nor it is biased by pooling over several points in time. The
test is based on the β-convergence regression7:
pik(t1) = αk + pi · pik(t0) + uikt1 (2.1)
pik(t1) = ln(P
i
k(t1)) is the natural logarithm of price P of product (or product
group) k in country i in period t1. Using OLS, it is regressed on pik(t0), the log price in
period t0. As the mean  i.e., the average of the log prices  towards which reversion
is measured might be product speciﬁc, a product ﬁxed eﬀects αk is employed. Mean
reversion measures the decrease of deviations of prices from the (product k speciﬁc)
country groups average. The coeﬃcient pi can then be interpreted as the remainder
of period t0`s price deviation in period t1 and pi < 1 implies mean reversion. The
smaller is pi, the stronger is the mean reversion.
In addition to the mean reversion, there are random shocks captured in the error
terms uikt. Hence β-convergence does not necessarily imply that price dispersion
actually decreases.
For the Wald-test whether the variance σ2t declined over time against the null
hypothesis that the variance remained constant (H0 : σ2t0 = σ
2
t1
vs. H1 : σ2t0 >
σ2t1), Egger & Pfaﬀermayr (2009) derive the following test statistic, which is χ
2(1)
distributed8 :
W0 =
N(σˆ2t0(pˆi
2 − 1) + σˆ2u)2
4σˆ4t0σˆ
2
u
∼ χ2(1) (2.2)
To calculate this one-sided test, the estimated variance of the regression's resid-
uals σˆ2u and the corresponding coeﬃcient pˆi as well as the number of observations
N are taken from the β-convergence regression above. In addition, we need σˆ2t0 , the
estimated variance of prices at the initial date t0, which is deﬁned as:
σˆ2t0 =
1
N
K∑
k=1
Ik∑
i=1
(pik(t0)− p¯k(t0))2 (2.3)
Here K is the total number of products (or product groups), Ik is the number of
reporting countries for product (or product group) k and N =
∑K
k=1 Ik is the total
6Another approach would be to look at non-parametric methods as in Quah (1996), who shows
that even without σ-convergence, "convergence clubs" may evolve. In our research we follow the
parametric σ-convergence literature, as we look at how exogenously given groups evolve.
7In the literature, an equivalent formulation of the regression above exists (hence the name
β-convergence):
∆pik(t1) = α+ β · pik(t0) + uikt1
Using this formulation, mean reversion is observed if β < 0.
8The same test can be used to test for divergence:
H0 : σ
2
t0 = σ
2
t1 vs. H1 : σ
2
t0 < σ
2
t1
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number of observations. For the 34 product groups, Ik always equals 8, 15 or 23
respectively. For the individual products, Ik varies.9 Note that price convergence
is conditional on the product (but not on the country), since when calculating the
variance in equation (2.3), the deviation of each price pik from p¯k is used for each
product (or product group) k. Alternatively, the price data can be demeaned, i.e.,
normalized such that p¯k(t) = 1Ik
∑Ik
i=1 p
i
k(t) = 0 for t = t0, t1 and each k (Egger
& Pfaﬀermayr, 2009, p. 460, footnote 5). pik(t) is then actually the deviation of
country i's price from the average price across countries (e.g., across EU15 coun-
tries). Price level indices in logs are generally demeaned by deﬁnition, however, for
considering the diﬀerent groups of countries (EU8, EU15, EU23), also price level
indices have to be renormalized such that the mean of the respective country group
is equal to zero (e.g., p¯k,EU8 = 0). With properly demeaned data, the product ﬁxed
eﬀects αk in equation (2.1) will equal zero.
The considered time period covers the years of the hike and the subsequent fall
in world market food prices in the years 2007 and 2008 and also the recession year
2009. Insofar as these shocks aﬀect prices in the countries considered equally, the
eﬀects are captured in the averages p¯k and price convergence is unchanged. However,
these shocks may aﬀect prices diﬀerently or at diﬀerent speed in diﬀerent countries,
which could then be interpreted as shocks uik counteracting price convergence.
2.4.2 Convergence decomposition
For the interpretation of the results on price convergence or divergence, we decom-
pose the variance of a single product group k into within-groups and between-groups
variances:10
σ2k,EU23 =
15
23
· σ2k,EU15 +
8
23
· σ2k,EU8 +
15
23
· p¯2k,EU15 +
8
23
· p¯2k,EU8
where σ2k,EU23 (σ
2
k,E15, σ
2
k,E8) is the variance of product k's prices within EU23
(EU15, EU8) and p¯2k,EU15 (p¯
2
k,EU8) is the squared mean of product k's prices within
EU15 (EU8). In Appendix A.1.1, we show that for the special case of price level
indices, where p¯EU23 = 0, the decomposition can be further simpliﬁed, aggregated
over products groups k and extended to changes (e.g., ∆σ2EU23 = σ
2
EU23,t−σ2EU23,t−1):
∆σ2EU23 =
15
23
∆σ2EU15 +
8
23
∆σ2EU8 +
8
15
1
34
34∑
k=1
∆p¯2k,EU8 (2.4)
9This expression is more general than in Egger & Pfaﬀermayr (2009), as it does not restrict its
use to cases with the same number of reported observations for every observed entity (e.g., I ﬁrms
in each of K industries).
10The basis of this decomposition is the same as in the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).
While ANOVA then uses this decomposition to test if the subgroups' population means are the
same, we want to know to what extent the variance between or within subgroups has changed. For
the special case of only two subgroups, ANOVA is actually identical to the t-test (Rabe-Hesketh
& Skrondal, 2008).
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The estimated change of the variance within EU23 equals the weighted sum of
variance changes within the subgroups EU15 and EU8, plus a term measuring the
change of the dispersion between the two subgroups (between-groups variance). To
estimate the signiﬁcances of the ﬁrst two terms, the Wald-Test proposed above is
used. The latter term's signiﬁcance can be estimated with a simple paired t-test or
a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. Note however, that this equation only
refers to the semi-aggregate data at the product group level, as due to the missing
data at the level of individual products, the weights would diﬀer for the individual
products.
2.5 σ-convergence
In this section, we analyse σ-convergence both at the level of individual products
and of the product groups. Signiﬁcant β-convergence is found in all cases, i.e., both
for products and for product groups and for all time periods considered.
2.5.1 Convergence within country groups at a disaggregate
level - products
As mentioned in section 2.3, the set of prices observed has somewhat changed over
time and not all prices are reported in all countries. We only include those prod-
ucts, for which prices are reported at all three dates (2003, 2006 and 2009) and
for which more than 50% of the observations are available in both EU8 and EU15,
which leaves us with 147 products11. This ensures that for every product we indeed
measure convergence towards EU8/15/23 averages and not yet another subgroup of
these.
Table 2.1: σ-convergence results at the product level.
K N 2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
∆σˆ2EU23 147 2817 -0.0282*** -0.0168*** -0.0450***
(585.50) (373.71) (1370.23)
∆σˆ2EU15 147 1824 -0.0025*** -0.0033*** -0.0058***
(12.00) (28.52) (56.25)
∆σˆ2EU8 147 993 -0.0189*** -0.0038*** -0.0227***
(386.40) (28.55) (553.16)
Notes: The table reports the change of the variance of pooled product prices
in the given period. Wald-test statistics are given in brackets, *** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
11Varying the cut-oﬀ level between 25% and 80% does not change the qualitative results.
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Table 2.1 shows the changes of the estimated variances and the results of the
Wald-test12. Prices have signiﬁcantly converged in all country groups EU8/15/23 in
both subperiods 2003-2006 and 2006-2009, and thus in the entire period 2003-2009.
The decrease in the variance of prices within EU15, is rather small. Within EU8
the eﬀect is much stronger in the sub-period 2003-2006 right after accession than in
2006-2009, where the change in variance is roughly of the same size as in EU15.
As described in section 4, these results are obtained when the estimation is run
with pooled data and thus refer to the question, if overall, food prices have converged
when considered at the disaggregate level of prices for narrowly deﬁned individual
products. A further question that might be of interest is how price dispersion for in-
dividual products has evolved over time. Convergence results for the single products,
that can be found in Figure 2.3, support the results for the pooled data: Between
2003 and 2009 prices have converged for a majority of products within EU23, EU15
and EU8, and this eﬀect is least pronounced in EU15.
2.5.2 Convergence within country groups at a semi-aggregate
level - product groups
In this subsection, price convergence at the level of product group price level indices
is considered. These price level indices are available since 1995 for EU15 and since
2001 for EU8 (whereas prices for individual products are only available since 2003).
The σ-convergence results are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: σ-convergence results at the product group level.
N 1995- 1998- 2001- 2003- 2006- 1995- 2003-
1998 2001 2003 2006 2009 2009 2009
∆σˆ2EU23 782 0.0115*** -0.0249*** -0.0162*** -0.0411***
(136.59) (609.01) (538.64) (1309.90)
∆σˆ2EU15 510 -0.0092*** 0.0027*** -0.0004 0.0042*** -0.0018*** -0.0045*** 0.0024***
(334.68) (39.76) (0.52) (87.16) (15.72) (42.95) (24.28)
∆σˆ2EU8 272 0.0007 -0.0143*** 0.0046*** -0.0097***
(1.56) (748.82) (168.14) (224.07)
Notes: The table reports the change of the variance of pooled product group price level indices in the given
period. Wald-test statistics are given in brackets and *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Within EU15, we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant σ-convergence in the period from 1995
to 1998 (the period right after Finland, Sweden and Austria had joined the EU)
and in 2006-2009, but price dispersion is still higher in 2009 than in 1998. In the
other periods, the food price level indices diverge or the results are not signiﬁcant.
Hence since 1998, within the old member countries EU15, prices do not converge
any more. Looking at EU23 in the period 2001-2003 right before the EU enlarge-
ment, the product groups' price level indices signiﬁcantly diverge, but they converge
12For this one-sided test, the critical values of the χ2(1) test statistic at the 10%/5%/1% signif-
icance level are 2.71/3.84/6.63.
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strongly in the periods after the accession. In our last subgroup (EU8), price disper-
sion fell after these countries joined the EU and slightly rose again in the following
period 2006-2009. Figure 2.4, shows the results for individual product groups for
the period 2003-2009. In EU23, only two product groups diverge, whereas price
dispersion falls for all other product groups. Price level indices also converged for
most product groups in EU8. In EU15, the picture is mixed, and on the whole, price
divergence dominates.
Comparing results for individual products and for product groups
Comparing table 1 and table 2 shows, that the results for the disaggregate level of
individual products and the semi-aggregate level of product groups diﬀer in some
cases. Results are sensitive to the level of aggregation. While at the level of invidual
products, prices converge in all cases considered, this does not hold for the product
group price level indices. For EU15, product group price level indices diverge in the
period 2003-2006, and this eﬀect is so strong, that there is also divergence for the
longer period of 2003-2009. In the EU8, price level indices diverged between 2006
and 2009, but in the longer period of 2003-2009, this divergence is dominated by
the strong convergence in the earlier period of 2003-2006.
However, the diﬀering results are not inconsistent with each other. There are
several explanations why convergence at the level of individual products may diﬀer
from convergence for the product groups. First, we restrict our dataset to products
that are suﬃciently common (50% of EU8 as well as 50% of EU15 countries reporting
prices), which most likely diﬀers from the products used in each country for product
group aggregation. These most common products might converge faster than the
other ones. Second, the products in a given basket might enter with diﬀerent weights.
Thirdly, when aggregating the prices from products to product groups, relatively
cheap and relatively expensive products average out. As discussed in section 2.3, it
is possible that a price change contributes to convergence at the product level but
to divergence at the level of product groups (and vice versa).
Note however that the result of price convergence in EU23 both in the periods
2003-2006 and 2006-2009 is robust. When considering the long period 2003-2009
after accession, the result of price convergence within the EU8 also holds both at
the disaggregate level of products and of product groups. In contrast, within the
group of the old member countries EU15, prices converged between 2003 and 2009
when considered for individual products, but diverged at the product group level.
Thus it may indeed be relevant whether price convergence is considered based on
disaggregate or on semi-aggregate data. Prices for narrowly deﬁned products, that
are widespread in Europe, converged in EU15 on the whole, but this is not reﬂected
at the level of price level indices for the product groups.
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Figure 2.3: σ-convergence (∆σ2) by products, 2003 - 2009.
The graphs present the change of the variance of every product in the dataset for EU23, EU15 and
EU8. The ﬁrst bar depicts the pooled convergence result of the respective country group. Light
blue bars are not statistically signiﬁcant. Source: Eurostat data, own representation.
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Figure 2.4: σ-convergence (∆σ2) by product groups, 2003 - 2009.
The graphs present the change of the variance of every product group in the dataset for EU23,
EU15 and EU8. The ﬁrst bar depicts the pooled convergence result of the respective country
group. Light blue bars are not statistically signiﬁcant. Source: Eurostat data, own representation.
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2.5.3 Convergence between country groups
The σ-convergence results within country groups suggest, that the strong conver-
gence within EU23 could be caused by convergence between EU15 and EU8 and
not mainly by convergence within these two subgroups. To further investigate this
point, we look at the variance decomposition at the product group level (see section
2.4.2). Table 2.3 summarizes the results.13
Table 2.3: σ-convergence decomposition at the product groups level.
N 2001-2003 2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
∆σˆ2EU23 782 0.0115*** -0.0249*** -0.0162*** -0.0411***
15
23∆σˆ
2
EU15 510 -0.0002 0.0027*** -0.0012*** 0.0015***
8
23∆σˆ
2
EU8 272 0.0002 -0.0050*** 0.0016*** -0.0034***
8
15
1
K
∑K
k=1 ∆p¯
2
k,EU8 272 0.0115*** -0.0227*** -0.0166*** -0.0394***
Notes: The table presents the results of the convergence decomposition on the product
group level. The change of variance in the whole EU23 (ﬁrst line) can be decomposed
into the weighted change of EU15's variance (second line), the weighted change of EU8's
variance (third line) and the weighted change of the squared mean of the EU8 price level
indices (forth line). *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1%-level.
In the period before the accession (2001-2003), price dispersion both within EU8
and EU15 remained virtually unchanged. Price divergence within EU23 can be
explained by the fact that price diﬀerences between EU15 and EU8 increased. In
the period 2003-2009, i.e., after the enlargement shock, the decline in between-
groups variance amounts to more than 90% of the total convergence. In the last
sub-period considered (2006-2009), there would not be any convergence in EU23
without convergence between the old and new member states. Hence the driving
force behind the strong convergence within EU23 after the EU enlargement in 2004
is not convergence within these two subgroups, but between them. In 2003, p¯EU8
(the average of price level indices of all product groups in all EU8 countries) was
33% lower than the EU23 average while it was only 18% lower in 2009. Figure 2.5
illustrates the variance decomposition graphically.
One question that comes to mind is whether only the EU8's prices rose or if
prices actually moved towards each other. This cannot be distinguished when us-
ing price level indices. By construction, if one subgroup becomes relatively more
expensive, the mean of the whole sample changes and hence the other subgroup
has to become relatively less expensive. However, if we look at food prices at the
individual product level, we ﬁnd that the average price increase per year between
2003 and 2009 within EU15 was only 0.9%. In real terms prices then have actually
moved towards each other.
13The results of the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon test, whether 815
1
34
∑34
k=1 p¯
2
k,EU8 has changed
between two given points in time, can be found in appendix A.1.2 .
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Figure 2.5: Variance decomposition on the product groups level over time.
The graph presents the composition of the variance of EU23's product group price level indices
between 2001 and 2009. The weighted EU15 variance ( 1523 σˆ
2
EU15), the weighted EU8 variance
( 823 σˆ
2
EU8) and the weighted, squared mean of EU8 price level indices (
8
15
1
34
∑34
k=1 p¯
2
k,EU8) add up
to the variance in the whole EU23 (σˆ2EU23). Source: Eurostat data, own representation.
2.6 Conclusion
As on a perfectly integrated market, a good can only have one price, it is widely
expected that ongoing market integration leads to price convergence, thereby en-
hancing eﬃciency. However, from a theoretical point of view, prices need not neces-
sarily converge, as for instance retailing services are non-tradable and arbitrage will
be reluctant to react to retail price diﬀerences. Nevertheless, if price convergence
occurs, this can be interpreted as an indicator of market integration, showing that
the internal market project, which aims at increasing welfare, works well. This idea
can be applied to the new Central and Eastern European member states: price con-
vergence may indicate that these countries successfully integrate into the markets
of the European Union.
Using a unique micro level data set on retail food prices from the Eurostat-
OECD PPP Program, we ﬁnd that in the lead-up to accession (2001-2003), food
prices diverged within EU23. In contrast, price convergence has occured after 2003,
indicating that the enlargement had a vital eﬀect on food price dispersion. Given
that price convergence is found, the underlying dynamics and subgroup behavior
is of interest. The driving force behind price convergence in the European Union
is convergence between the two groups of countries EU8 and EU15, with the dif-
ference of average prices for food products of these two groups becoming smaller.
A subsequent research question could be whether convergence clubs as described
in Quah (1996) will endogeneously emerge. The possibly evolving clubs would not
necessarily have to coincide with the exogeneously determined country groups EU8
and EU15. We leave this question to further research.
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Chapter 3
Sex work: An introduction and a
new data set
Prostitution or sex work is often called the "oldest profession" in the world. While
the "meat for sex" theory argues that early predecessors of mankind traded food for
sex as early as 3.5 million years B.C. (Alfred, 2011, p. 238), the ﬁrst recordings only
date back as far as 600 B.C., when state brothels were introduced in ancient Greece
(Glazebrook & Henry, 2011, p.31). Although from an economic point of view there
has been a market for quite some time, from a legal perspective (and perhaps in a
literal meaning as well) the claim of the "oldest profession" does not hold.
Over the last three millennia, selling sexual services has always been part of
the black or gray market, but has not been a legitimate business (and in many
countries still is not). (Semi-) Illegal markets diﬀer from legal markets in that, for
example, basic legal rights granted in a legal market  like being payed after having
provided a service  cannot be enforced. Hence, price formation and market entrance
follow diﬀerent rules than in a legal market. Coping mechanisms to solve these
legal problems might result in additional cost and criminal activities (for a further
discussion see Becker et al., 2004; Feige, 1990). Although the German market for
sexual services has been legalized in 2001, it is still in a transition process and, for
example, costs due to social stigmatization still exist.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst give some background on sex work in general and then
present a newly created dataset on sex work in Germany. To build this dataset, we
wrote a script to download all information on services oﬀered between January, 16
in 2011 and September, 9 in 2012 on www.gesext.de, an online platform where sexual
services can be sold. As chapters 4 to 6 are based on sub-samples of this dataset,
we present the creation and descriptive statistics of the full sample in this chapter
in detail.1
1Although both men and women act as sellers in this market, in this work we focus on female
sellers. This is especially due to the lack of quality data on male sellers in our dataset, but also
because the female part of the market is by far larger than the rest.
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The next sections gives a
short historical overview on the legal status of sex work in Europe and especially in
Germany(Section 3.1) and discuss existing theories on price formation in the market
for sexual services (Section 3.2). Section 3.3 looks at modes of data generation as
well as existing datasets. Section 3.4 then describes how the www.gesext.de dataset
was generated and presents its basic descriptive statistics. In Section 3.5, regional
aspects of selected variables of the dataset are compared and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1 A historical overview of sex work in Germany
(and Europe)
As mentioned above, the ﬁrst recordings of sex work in Europe are from ancient
Greece and Rome, where sexual services were often provided by slaves without any
personal rights. Already there, but also during the following centuries up to the 20th
century, sex work has been deemed immoral and was often illegal (Schmitter, 2013).
This led to a constant struggle between ethical (religious) doubts about the morality
of women selling (or being forced to sell) these services and men nevertheless keeping
on demanding them. Since the early days of Christianity, the woman was deemed
to be the cause of all evil, seducing men into buying sexual services, but this was
still considered better than permanently violating the bible's sixth commandment:
"Thou shalt not commit adultery" or commit a sexually motivated crime. This view
has stayed alive up until the 20th century and explains why the church did not use
its inﬂuence to abolish prostitution (Schmitter, 2013, p.23).
From the 13th to the 15th century, city-run brothels (so called womens' houses)
were introduced. For easier identiﬁcation, women had to wear special dresses and live
in these houses, hitherto stigmatizing them (Sanger, 2006). These womens' houses
were abolished with the reformation in the 16th century, only to be reintroduced
in the 18th century.2 In the mid of the 19th century and during the beginning of
the 20th century, the ambiguous statutory state of the business became particularly
clear. On the one hand, it was illegal to advertise or rent apartments to sell sexual
services, ban zones were installed by local authorities and claims for payment after
having delivered these services could not be enforced. On the other hand, buying
and selling sexual services was largely tolerated (during the second world war, the
military even operated their own brothels in regions occupied by German forces)
and sex workers had to register with local health authorities and even to pay taxes
(Schmitter, 2013, p.23).
In Germany, this legal nirvana was ended by several court rulings in the 1990s
and by a new legal setting in 2002 (Kavemann & Steﬀan, 2013). Sex work still
2Martin Luther famously compared state run brothels to having state run houses for murderers
(Schmitter, 2013, p.23)
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cannot be regarded as a job like every other one: the job centers do not suggest sex
work as a possible source of income to the unemployed and buyers cannot enforce the
fulﬁllment of a concluded contract as in other markets. Yet, with the introduction
of this new law, sex workers were accredited many rights and duties normal workers
have. These include, among others, the access to the governmental health insurance
system, to rent apartments for selling sexual services, to sue for payment thereof,
but also the duty to pay business tax.3 In most cities, the so called "Duesseldorf
procedure" has been adopted (and had already been in use in several cities before
the new law was introduced) requiring women to pay a daily ﬂat tax when oﬀering
services. In addition, some cities have introduced a tax on renting apartments for
oﬀering sexual services (e.g., 10 Euro per square meter and year in Stuttgart; Preiss,
2012).
From a European perspective, countries can be divided into four categories: 1)
selling sexual services is illegal (e.g., Croatia, Serbia), 2) selling sexual services is
legal, but buying them is illegal (Sweden, Norway), 3) selling sexual services is legal,
but brothels, pimping, and sometimes advertising and street work are illegal (e.g.,
France, Spain, United Kingdom) and 4) selling sexual services is legal (e.g., Austria,
Germany). The German laws are very progressive as sex workers have extensive
legal and social rights, but what all European countries have in common is that
forced prostitution and human traﬃcking are illegal (for a further discussion see
Cho et al., 2012). To sum up, in Germany sex work has always been in a legal
gray (and moral black) area, but with changing social and moral attitudes of society
and law makers, it has been decriminalized within the last 15 years. Furthermore,
as sex work remains illegal in other European countries, Germany has become a
destination for sex tourism from neighboring countries (Barnett, 2013). However,
the exact market size and the number of sex workers remain unknown. Estimates
range from 64,000 to 200,000 sex workers, earning up to 14.5 billion Euro (Reichel
& Topper, 2003; Kavemann & Steﬀan, 2013).
In general, this market can be divided into three sections: Street level sex ser-
vices, brothels and escort services (private oﬀerings)  with average income and
personal safety of the sex worker increasing in this order. While the exchange and
contracting of the ﬁrst two sectors takes place to a large extent in the "oine"
world by simply visiting certain locations, in the third part appointments are made
by telephone or via the internet and the meeting takes place at an arranged location.
The upcoming of the internet has had a strong impact on this market. For sellers
it has become easier and safer to advertise and ﬁnd customers. Hence, the supply
side of this market has increased. Furthermore (although only for online sellers),
the risk of becoming a victim of violence and catching a sexually transmitted dis-
3As a side-eﬀect, also the renting out of rooms to sex workers has been decriminalized, leading
to stronger competition in the market and the emergence of very large brothels. Europe's largest
brothel  situated in Stuttgart  spans an area of 5800m2.
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ease, as well as getting caught by the police (in countries where sex work is illegal),
has decreased (Cunningham & Kendall, 2011b). Today, in Germany exists a large
number of websites on which sex workers can advertise or sell their services.
3.2 Theory on the market for sex
The market for sexual services diﬀers from normal markets in many ways. There is
a moral stigma to selling sexual services, the risk of physical violence exists and in
some countries, selling sexual services is even illegal (see above). This has several
consequences on the price formation in the market and the willingness to enter it.
First of all, moral stigma drives up the cost of providing sexual services, as sex
workers have to be compensated. Second, in illegal markets the lack of access to the
legal institutions does not allow sellers to enforce contracts. This risk has either to be
factored in or sellers pay for protection by, e.g., organized crime. Third, participants
might risk punishment when their participation is discovered, which again can be
factored in or be minimized by paying for protection (for a further discussion on
illegal markets see Ruggiero et al., 2002). All three points lead to higher prices and
lower entrance than in legal markets. On the other hand, cost might be lower, as
no taxes have to be payed and no state regulations have to be complied with.
Compensation for opportunity cost
The existence of a wage premium for sex workers compared to non sex workers is
generally acknowledged by the theoretical (and especially the empirical) literature on
price formation and market entrance in the market for sexual services. The literature
also acknowledges that this wage premium must be due to some sort of market power
and / or compensation for opportunity cost. Selling sexual services is probably best
modeled as monopolistic competition, an idea ﬁrst introduced by Chamberlin (1933).
Although most articles in the sex work literature use the general idea of sexual
services being diﬀerentiated goods, the only adaptation of this model to sex work is
by Cunningham & Kendall (2010b). Each sex worker sells one or several varieties of
a given product (sex) and has some market power for her variety. In the standard
model of monopolistic competition, sellers and demand are symmetric, which in the
long run results in a unique market clearing price at zero proﬁts.4 However, if sellers
and demand are heterogeneous, there need not be just one price. Sellers can charge a
higher price if they have higher (opportunity) cost to provide their variety or higher
market power due to oﬀering a more unique or more demanded variety only they
can provide. For example, the demand for high class  beautiful and smart  escort
services can only be met by very few sellers, who need to pay for expensive dresses
4As long as proﬁts can be made, other sellers will enter the market and buyers substitute to
these new varieties, hence lowering demand for existing varieties. Market power is gone and prices
are lower.
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and manicure, and could work in a good paying non sex work job as well.5
This idea is also acknowledged in the other models concerning price formation
in the sex work market. While Arunachalam & Shah (2012) as well as Cunningham
(2011) focus on higher market power of a given sex worker compared to other sex
workers  due to being more beautiful, oﬀering rare services, etc.  other articles
focus on wage premia compared to non sex workers. Here, Rao et al. (2003), Gertler
et al. (2005), Robinson et al. (2011) and Arunachalam & Shah (2013) mainly focus
on opportunity costs. They argue that sex workers have to be compensated for risks
such as being arrested, encountering violence or catching a sexually transmitted
disease.6 A substantially broader interpretation of opportunity cost (e.g., social
exclusion, boredom while waiting for customers, loss of recreational sex pleasure,
highly skewed lifetime earnings due to early retirement, etc.) and excess demand
for certain services are the explanation for wage premia in Cameron (2002). In
addition, there are some alternative models worth mentioning that rather discuss
a seller's decision to enter the market and have brought diﬀerent new aspects into
this literature.
Market entrance
In a theoretical paper Edlund & Korn (2002) model the market for sex work such
that women are confronted with a binary choice: they can either choose to get
married or to become a sex worker. Both groups provide sex to men.7 While the
ﬁrst group has a normal job and additionally beneﬁts from their husbands earnings,
in an equilibrium the latter group has to be compensated for their losses on the
marriage market. Apart from introducing a new form of opportunity cost (foregone
earnings from getting married), an interesting application of this model is that
migrants should be able to oﬀer sexual services at lower prices, as their potential
spouses at home are less likely to ﬁnd out about their job as a sex worker and hence
marriage opportunities are less decreased.8
5Empirically, the wage of a given sex worker could then be determined by adding up the price
premium for 1) every single attribute of this sex worker and 2) the circumstances under which he
or she oﬀers services, both compared to the average sex worker or the average worker.
6For more on a risk-premium on unprotected sex see chapter 4 of this thesis
7An interesting assumption about the female utility function in this model is that in both cases
they "do not care for sex, but derive utility from their children [...] and consumption (Edlund &
Korn, 2002, p192).
8In an answer to this article Arunachalam & Shah (2008) strongly reject Edlund and Korn's
theory and defend the idea of wage premia just being risk compensations. Using a dataset on sex
work in Ecuador and Mexico, their argument is two-fold. First, there are many sex workers that
get married and at a young age, when wage premia are highest, sex workers are more likely to be
married than non sex workers. Second, they also ﬁnd a wage premium for male sex workers, which
should not exist if it was a compensation for forgone marriage opportunities. However, their study
does not allow to completely reject the Edlund and Korn model. In their wage premium regression,
they do not distinguish between married and unmarried sex workers. Additionally, the fact that
at younger ages sex workers are more likely to be married than non-sex workers does not reveal
anything about the likelihood of the other sex workers to get married later on. In fact, they state
that in Ecuador the average sex worker  unconditional on age  is 16% less likely to be married.
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In Della Giusta et al. (2009a) and Della Giusta et al. (2009b), the central argu-
ment is based on social stigma  the cost of society ﬁnding out that an individual
is a (part-time) sex worker. Individuals have a normal job and if income from pro-
viding sexual services exceeds reputation losses they will start to participate in the
market of sexual services. In general, their model assumes that men or women could
both be sellers, but with income diﬀerentials, the group with the higher income (in
most societies men) will demand and the other group will provide sexual services.
In their model the threshold to become a seller rises, the more "free pre-marital
sex" is provided and the higher income of the sellers and / or reputation losses are.
Furthermore, price premia for selling sexual services increase the higher income from
normal jobs on the seller side is and the higher potential reputation losses of both
the buyer and the seller are. This has three interesting implications: First, in their
model rich women can also be consumers of sexual services. Second, with women
being able to control pregnancy, the cost of oﬀering "free sex" decreases and less
sexual services for pay will be provided (and if they are provided the price premium
is lower). Third, as in the Edlund & Korn (2002) model, for migrant sellers reputa-
tion losses are lower and they can provide sexual services at lower prices. The same
is true if social stigmatization decreases.
The idea of the Della Giusta et al. (2009b) model is extended in Cunningham &
Kendall (2010b), distinguishing between ﬁxed and variable cost of supplying sexual
services (stigma and correspondingly lower marriage opportunities vs. risk of dis-
eases, arrest, etc.). With lower ﬁxed (and also variable) cost, workers will enter the
market more frequently. Given that they entered, they will provide more services
due to their lower variable cost. This result again leads to three interesting new
implications. First, with a negative income shock an individual is more likely to
become a seller. Second, if one assumes that more educated individuals have higher
income in normal jobs, which they could loose by entering the market, and shorter
spans of unemployment, their ﬁxed cost are higher. With better access to credit
markets, negative income shocks can more easily be absorbed. Third, given that
they already have entered the market, these sellers should have lower variable cost,
as they have less violent, higher-status clients, a lower risk of getting arrested and
can bundle sexual and escort services (nice dinners or opera visits).
Last but not least, Cameron & Collins (2003) as well as Collins & Judge (2008)
present a model of male participation in the market. Similarly to the models above,
opportunity costs such as search time for sexual encounters, gaining additional plea-
sures from variety, etc. are used to explain if a man enters the market or not. Their
models imply that by changing the regulatory setting, policy makers can inﬂuence
male participation and risk-taking.
In part, the propositions made by the models presented here have been tested.
The most researched part of the literature are the wage premia and incentives to
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oﬀer risk-taking, but there is generally a lack of good data concerning this market.
The next section gives an overview of the existing datasets.
3.3 Data availability and quality
Although sex work has always been a more or less open part of societies, economists
only recently have started to pay attention to this market. There are some earlier
studies and books on the economics of prostitution (e.g., Reynolds, 1986), but nearly
all existing empirical studies have been conducted during the last 10 to 15 years. This
is mainly due to the data availability being just recently enhanced by government
funded programs (e.g., Arunachalam & Shah, 2013) and the existence of internet
platforms (e.g., Cunningham & Kendall, 2010b).
Whereas there exist at least some macro level (aggregate on the national level)
estimates on the volume of the sex work sector in Germany (e.g., Nagel, 2013),
there is no micro level data (i.e., information on single transactions) available in
Germany. Until recently, this kind of data could only be acquired by studying
police reports or directly surveying sex workers. In gathering information from
match maker platforms in the internet, a third way has emerged. While in this
thesis we use the third strategy to create a dataset, we shortly discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of all three information gathering strategies and present existing
datasets along the way. An overview of most of these datasets' results can be found
in chapters 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1, where we present the empirical results of the literature
corresponding to the respective chapter's research question.
Police reports are only a source of information in regions where the provision
and consumption of sex work is illegal. Obviously these are hard to get hands on,
and if one can look into this kind of data (e.g., as in the US; Della Giusta et al.,
2009a), the subject pool is highly biased (arrested sex workers or clients) and might
be unwilling to answer questions truthfully, trying to minimize legal consequences.
Surveys have the advantage that, at least in theory, they can capture all parts
of the market, but they as well might be subject to biases. First, they rely on
the possibility to create a representative sample and the sex workers' willingness
to cooperate. This might introduce a bias due to self-selection into the study of
sex workers willing to answer at all and unavailability of individuals from certain
sectors of the market. For example, in most studies using survey data, the online
market is not represented (e.g., Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005; Arunachalam
& Shah, 2013). Second, they rely on the sex workers' ability to remember all details
correctly and willingness to answer truthfully. Questions into sex work are a very
private and sensitive matter. For example, information on transaction prices might
be biased by fear that the surveyor is related to tax authorities in some way or the
rate of condom use might be exaggerated if the survey is carried out as a part of an
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anti AIDS campaign. In general, survey data can be used and biases corrected, but
survey data might have their limits (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).
Finally, extracting data from an (online) match-maker platform has the same
disadvantage as survey data have, in that the observed individuals only represent a
part of the market. Only individuals willing to make an oﬀer on the speciﬁc platform
under observation will be included in the dataset (which for example excludes street
sex workers). But one advantage is that at best actual contracts can be observed,
including the information on appearances, services oﬀered, etc., which are provided
to the other party before a contract is made and the price actually paid. Even if
these were wrongly stated, this is the information a potential buyer has and hence
in a market economy the price he pays should correspond to his willingness to pay
for the speciﬁc service oﬀered.
While for Germany, to the best of our knowledge, there is no other dataset on
sex work with information on single transactions, internationally there exist some
datasets. Most of these datasets are survey based and located in developing or
emerging countries. Usually surveys are conducted by people trusted by the sex
workers (medical staﬀ or former sex workers) and ask for personal information as
well as details on the last three or more contracts with clients. This is true for
all of the following datasets: In the framework of an HIV/AIDS intervention in
1993 Rao et al. (2003) surveyed 608 sex workers in the brothels of one nightlife
district in Calcutta, India. In 2001, Gertler et al. (2005) selected the two regions in
Mexico with the highest HIV rates and surveyed roughly 1, 000 sex workers identiﬁed
through the local AIDS program. Gertler & Shah (2011) and Arunachalam & Shah
(2008, 2012, 2013) use Ecuadorian data collected in 2003 by a national Ecuadorian
STI prevention program, aiming at surveying a representative sample of 3, 000 sex
workers all over the country. In 2004 - 2006, de la Torre et al. (2010) interviewed
sex workers in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, who had engaged in unprotected sex prior
to the survey. Robinson et al. (2011) had 192 sex workers in a Kenyan border
town write journals about their sexual encounters and health status and created
a very rich dataset of 19, 041 transactions over the course of three month. Finally
Chang &Weng (2012) interviewed 140 randomly selected street sex workers in Taipei
city, Taiwan's largest sex district. The only dataset surveying sex workers online
is Cunningham & Kendall (2010b), who in 2008 reached out to roughly 13, 000 sex
workers in the United States of America and received back 685 questionnaires.
Online platform based datasets include Moﬀatt & Peters (2004), who in 1998
created a dataset of reviews on male sex workers in the UK and Edlund et al. (2009),
as well as Cunningham & Kendall (2010a,b, 2011b) who look at a review website for
female sex workers in the United States of America. Both studies utilize downloaded
information from www.theeroticreview.com on more than 100,000 sex workers with
more than 500,000 reviews , who were oﬀering sexual services between 1998 and 2008.
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A third dataset is by Cunningham & Kendall (2011a), who downloaded classiﬁed
advertisement of sex workers from craiglist.com, oﬀering services during a three day
period of the two big political parties national conventions in 2008. However, these
three datasets utilize oﬀer or reviewer data and not actual contracts. In this way,
the www.gesext.de data we used to create our dataset is unique.
3.4 The www.gesext.de dataset
As we are especially interested in micro-level data on concluded contracts, we follow
the strategy of downloading data from an online match maker site. In the German
market, there exist several of these match-making platforms, of which the largest and
most prominent one is www.gesext.de. Individuals can oﬀer all kinds of sex related
products and sexual services on this website, which basically works like ebay. Sellers
can oﬀer their products and services as an auction with a given end date or at a ﬁxed
price or both at the same time. When buyers enter the site, they can ﬁlter oﬀers for
their region and see all active oﬀers. They can then, depending on the type of oﬀer,
either bid on an auction according to their willingness to pay or buy a ﬁxed price
oﬀer directly at the ﬁxed price. While an auction will be won by the highest bidder
(who has to pay the second highest bid), the ﬁxed price oﬀer will go to the ﬁrst
bidder. A registration is needed both for selling and buying and both parties have
to be at least 18 years old.9 The platform keeps full names and addresses of both
parties and exchanges contact information after a contract was made (although the
real name will not be provided). Sellers have to pay 15% of the end price to the
platform owners as a match making fee, buyers normally pay cash at the beginning
of the meeting.
In general there seems to be a market for male as well as female sex workers.
However, on this platform men mostly sell services at very low prices, sometimes even
for 1 euro, and pay the hotel cost themselves. Due to these mostly negative earnings
for male oﬀerings, we restricted our analysis to women oﬀering sexual services.
To gather the data we wrote a python10 script that runs on a server and checks
twice a day if new oﬀers have been added to the platform. A second script checks
daily if an oﬀer has been ﬁnished and adds the URL links of these oﬀers to a list.
This list can then be used to download the information on all concluded contracts,
which consists of three parts: general information, a free text (including a free
text title) and pictures. The oﬀers contain rich information on the female sellers,
but unfortunately hardly any information on the sellers (except for their nickname,
bidder history and rating).
9The age is checked using the individuals identity card number.
10Python is a programming language.
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General information
Figure 3.1 shows an example of an oﬀer. As the general information part of the
data is well structured, we were able to write a script using pattern recognition that
can automatically extract this information. Table 3.1 presents all variables we were
able to extract automatically from the raw data.
Figure 3.1: Example oﬀer
The ﬁgure presents an example of an oﬀer at www.gesext.de. It consists of three parts: The title,
general (structured) information and a free text ﬁeld. Additionally sellers can post pictures of
themselves. Source: www.gesext.de, translated.
The script ran from January 16 in 2011 to September 9 in 2012, downloading a
total of 102,096 oﬀers posted on this website.11 Of the 102, 096 downloaded oﬀers,
23% of the services were oﬀered as an auction, 44% at a ﬁxed price and 33% as
11Descriptive statistics in this chapter deviate from the following chapters, as these look at
diﬀerent sub samples of the full sample presented here.
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both.12 The average starting price of an auction was 152 Euro and the average ﬁxed
price oﬀer was 185 Euro. 33% of the oﬀers were sold (17% as an auction and 16%
at a ﬁxed price). While 52% of the services oﬀered exclusively as an auction were
sold, only 30% of the ﬁxed price oﬀers and 23% of services oﬀered in both ways
were sold. The average sold price was 186 Euro (210 Euro for auctions, 168 Euro for
ﬁxed price oﬀers and 176 if both was oﬀered), which corresponds to an hourly wage
of 103 Euro (93 Euro, 114 Euro and 100 Euro, respectively).13 These hourly wages
are quite high compared to the median hourly wage in Germany of 14 Euro (Brenke
& Grabka, 2011), but do not account for standby time and expenses (estimated to
be about 50% of transaction cost; Nagel, 2013). Sold oﬀers were on average online
for 5.2 days (7.1, 3.2 and 5.4 days, respectively) and sold auctions had an average
of 8.6 bids. In the sample period 3, 444 women were active, posting on average 30.0
oﬀers and selling 9.7 services. The 14, 093 men in our sample made on average 7.2
bids and bought 2.4 services.
Depending on which estimate of the whole population of sex workers and their
clients in Germany is used (see Nagel, 2013), this corresponds to 0.2−0.5% of female
sex workers in Germany and 0.13− 0.14% of male clients. When oﬀering a service,
sellers specify the ﬁrst two digits of the postal area they are oﬀering their service
in.14 In each of these 95 two digit zip codes on average 1, 074.7 services were oﬀered
of which on average 349.8 were sold. Together with the seller and buyer nicknames,
the regional identiﬁer makes this dataset very unique. With the two digit zip-code
it is possible to exploit geographical information and the nicknames allow to look
at repeated observations of both the buyers and the sellers. In addition, sellers and
buyers give each other a rating, which also could be automatically extracted from
the data. The average rating of a seller (by her former customers) is 98.3% and of
a buyer 96.7%. If a service is falsely described or a seller / buyer does not fulﬁll the
contract, the counter party is rated rather low. Hence, misunderstandings between
sellers and buyers or falsely described services seem to occur seldom.
Information in the free texts
In addition to the obligatory structured information, sellers can give more in-
formation in the title, subtitle and the free text ﬁeld. Figure 3.1 shows a fairly
representative example of such a description. In this part of the oﬀer, sellers de-
scribe themselves, the kind of service they oﬀer (and do not oﬀer), and sometimes
impose restrictions on who may bid (e.g., minimum age). Text length ranges from 2
to 1, 614 words with an average of 190 words of which on average 3% are misspelled.
12If an oﬀer is made both as a buy now and an auction article, in the beginning it can be bought
directly at the ﬁxed price. As soon as one person bids on the auction, it cannot be bought at a
ﬁxed price anymore.
13In the free texts, sellers provide the duration of the oﬀered service, which we used to calculate
hourly wages.
14Germany uses a 5 digit zip code system to identify postal areas.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics - Free texts
Variable name Type Mean SD
Seller speciﬁes age binary 0.64 0.48
Age in years if stated metric 31.87 8.87
Seller speciﬁes height binary 0.53 0.50
Height in cm if stated metric 166.85 6.19
Seller speciﬁes weight binary 0.31 0.47
Weight in kg if stated metric 65.15 20.55
Seller speciﬁes hair color binary 0.84 0.37
Hair color blond if stated binary 0.44 0.50
Hair color brown if stated binary 0.20 0.40
Hair color black if stated binary 0.32 0.47
Hair color red if stated binary 0.04 0.20
Seller speciﬁes hair length binary 0.25 0.43
Hair long if stated binary 0.89 0.31
Seller claims to have tattoo binary 0.04 0.19
Seller claims to have piercing binary 0.07 0.26
Seller claims to be intimately shaved binary 0.24 0.43
Seller speciﬁes cupsize binary 0.88 0.33
Cupsize medium if stated binary 0.63 0.48
Cupsize large if stated binary 0.28 0.45
Seller claims to be in relationship binary 0.05 0.22
Seller claims to be single binary 0.05 0.21
Seller claims to be higher educated binary 0.04 0.19
Seller claims to be no professional sex worker binary 0.27 0.44
Duration of the service in hours metric 2.87 7.75
Seller does not kiss binary 0.03 0.29
Seller oﬀers massage only binary 0.01 0.10
Seller oﬀers manual stimulation only binary 0.02 0.15
Seller oﬀers oral stimulation only binary 0.10 0.30
Seller speciﬁes something about vaginal sex binary 0.94 0.24
Seller oﬀers vaginal sex, no anal sex binary 0.72 0.45
Seller speciﬁes something about anal sex binary 0.52 0.50
Seller oﬀers vaginal and anal sex binary 0.16 0.37
Seller speciﬁes something about condom use binary 0.78 0.41
Seller oﬀers sex without condom binary 0.04 0.20
Seller speciﬁes something about the location binary 0.88 0.32
Seller oﬀers service at hotel binary 0.48 0.50
Seller oﬀers service at seller's home binary 0.30 0.46
Seller oﬀers service at buyer's home binary 0.54 0.50
Seller oﬀers service outdoors binary 0.06 0.24
Seller oﬀers service in car binary 0.10 0.29
Seller oﬀers to go for dinner / drink binary 0.11 0.31
Seller claims to oﬀer for the ﬁrst time binary 0.03 0.16
Seller imposes minimum age on potential buyers binary 0.13 0.34
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables generated
from the free text ﬁelds. The underlying sample consists of all 102, 096
oﬀered services.
37
To extract information from these texts, we ﬁrst wrote a script that compares the
texts of the 102, 096 oﬀers to each other and looks for similarities ﬁnding identical
or nearly identical free texts. This reduces the number of free texts to analyze to
roughly 35, 000 texts. Again using pattern recognition the script looks for keywords
and automatically ﬁnds out the information we are interested in. As the meaning
of a keyword as well as more complex pattern recognition sometimes is ambiguous,
depending on the context, the results had to be checked manually. From January
2012 to October 2012, six students looked at the texts as well as the extracted infor-
mation and corrected them where necessary. The procedure was done a second time
by a diﬀerent student to make sure that no mistakes remained. Table 3.2 presents
a list of all variables generated from free texts.
Regarding the personal details posted in the free texts, we ﬁnd that 64% of the
sellers state their age, with an average of 31.9 years. The reported average height
and weight is 167cm and 65kg (stated by 53% and 31% of the sellers respectively).
84% of the sellers state their hair color (44% blond, 20% brown, 32% black, 4% red)
and 25% their hair length (89% long). 4% of these sellers claim to have a tattoo,
7% to have a piercing and 24% to be intimately shaved. Of the 88% sellers having
stated their cup size 9% claim to have small breast (A, AA), 63% to have medium
sized breast (B,C) and 28% to have large breast (D and larger). 5% of the sellers
claim to be in a relationship, 5% to be single and 3.9% to be university level students
or to have higher education.
In the free texts also the service oﬀered itself is being described. The average
duration of an oﬀered session is 2.9 hours. Interestingly the average sold auction
includes 3.1 hours of sexual services, while the average ﬁxed price oﬀer only includes
2.1 hours of services. 3% of the sellers decline to kiss, 0.01% of the oﬀers only include
a massage, 2% only manual stimulation, 10% only oral stimulation, 68% oﬀer vaginal
sex, but no anal sex, and 16% oﬀer both vaginal and anal sex. The remaining
4.7% do not disclose which services are included and which not. Nevertheless, the
platform explicitly sells sexual services and most of these services' free texts can
be interpreted such that the customers can actually assume that vaginal sex is also
oﬀered in these unspeciﬁed cases. For condom use, from reading the free texts, one
gets the impression that the standard is protected sex. If nothing is disclosed in the
text (in 22% of the oﬀers), customers must assume that they might have to use a
condom. 4.3% of the sellers explicitly oﬀer unprotected sex. The rate is quite low,
but a bit higher among sold services (6.4%).15 This rate might be even higher as
customers could pay an extra fee to get additional services when meeting the sex
worker.
Concerning the meeting place, 88.0% of the oﬀers specify possible locations: 48%
at a hotel, 30% at the buyers residence, 54% at the sellers residence, 6% outdoors
15For all other variables in this paragraph, the numbers for sold services are nearly the same as
for the oﬀers.
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(parks, etc.) and 10% in a car (sometimes even while driving). Note that oﬀering
multiple locations is possible. Additionally, 11% of the oﬀers include that the seller
will go to a bar or restaurant with the buyer (which the customer has to pay for).
When deciding where to oﬀer a service, there are two opposing arguments. On the
one hand, a hotel or the seller's own residency is safer for the seller, as she can
control the environment. On the other hand, hotel cost drive up the transaction's
complete price and the sellers' neighbors might start to wonder if every other day
a diﬀerent man drops by. This renders the buyers home or an outdoor place an
alternative.
Finally, 3% of the sellers claim to oﬀer for the ﬁrst time, 13% specify a minimum
age for the customers of 30 to 45 years and 27% claim to oﬀer sexual services
only privately, i.e., they claim to be no professional sex worker. This last feature
is interesting, because in other studies this part of the sex work business is not
represented at all. These sellers provide on average longer free texts, but their
personal attributes do not diﬀer that much. However, there are some diﬀerences.
14% of the non-professionals claim to be students, but none of the other sex workers.
They earn the same hourly wages, but oﬀer slightly diﬀerent services. Compared
to the sub-sample of other sex workers, the sub-sample of non-professionals oﬀers
longer sessions (3.1 vs. 2.7 hours) and rather vaginal sex, than other non-intercourse
services. Furthermore, they oﬀer less often unprotected sex (3.8% vs. 4.6% or for
sold services 5.7% vs. 6.7%) as well as anal sex (14.9% vs. 16.9%). Customers seem
not to favor one or the other group. Only four percent of the men who bought more
than one service only bought these from non-professional sex workers.16
Picture information
The third and ﬁnal part of the information is embodied in the up to three pictures
sellers can post with their oﬀerings. Again we wrote a script to ﬁnd duplicates,
which reduces the number of pictures necessary to examine from nearly 200, 000
to 46, 000. The same six students then looked at the unique pictures to extract
information (see table 3.3). To correct mistakes every picture was examined by a
diﬀerent student for a second time.
94% of the oﬀers included at least one, on average 1.9 pictures. Most sellers post
a picture of their full body (67%), and only wearing underwear (64%). While 27%
of the oﬀers include a picture of the naked breasts, only 8% (9% if sold) include a
picture of the seller completely naked (in 1.4% of the oﬀers even the vagina can be
seen). In 17% of the oﬀers most parts of the face and on 25% the whole face can
be seen. The last variable the students extracted was on the sellers weight, which
we could then use to update weight information of sellers that did not specify their
weight in the free texts. Of the 96, 293 oﬀers with a posted picture, 1.2% included an
16For more on the diﬀerences between professionals and non-professionals see section A.2.1 in
the appendix.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics - Picture information
Variable name Type Mean SD
Seller posts one or more pictures binary 0.94 0.23
Number of pictures posted metric 1.93 0.95
Seller posts picture of full body binary 0.67 0.47
Seller posts picture in underwear binary 0.64 0.48
Seller posts picture completely naked binary 0.08 0.27
Seller posts picture with naked breasts binary 0.27 0.44
Seller posts picture of vagina binary 0.01 0.12
Seller posts picture showing her face binary 0.25 0.43
Seller posts picture showing half her face binary 0.17 0.37
Seller posts picture and appears to be underweight binary 0.01 0.11
Seller posts picture and appears to be of normal weight binary 0.73 0.45
Seller posts picture and appears to be slightly overweight binary 0.21 0.41
Seller posts picture and appears to be obese binary 0.07 0.24
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables extracted from
pictures posted in an oﬀer. 94% of the 102, 096 oﬀers included at least one picture
and on average an oﬀer included 1.9 pictures.
underweight seller (BMI < 18.5), 73% a normal weight seller (18.5 < BMI ≤ 25),
21% a slight overweight seller (25 < BMI ≤ 30) and 7% an obese seller (BMI > 30).
As attributes such as good looks are subject to the viewer, we did not code these.
To sum up, the dataset we created has some unique features as it is based on
actual contracts and for every contract includes a regional, seller and buyer identiﬁer,
but it also has some disadvantages. Much information were only posted in a free
text and categorized by students. In some cases sellers did not post all necessary
information resulting in missing values. These gaps could partly be ﬁlled with
information from pictures (e.g., on the sellers weight in the pictures), but in other
cases information remains missing. Although this process was done twice, there
might remain some mistakes.
3.5 The geography of sex work in Germany
One valuable feature for research purposes of www.gesext.de is that sellers have to
specify the ﬁrst two digits of the postal area in which they intend to oﬀer their
service. This allows us to look at each area independently as well as to compare
the areas to each other. Furthermore, we can merge our dataset with regional dis-
aggregated data. One important dataset to mention here is the Genesis-online data
base by Destatis (the German national statistical bureau, Destatis, 2014) oﬀering
regional statistics on the level of local administrative units (LAU-2). These can be
aggregated to the level of 2 digit zip code areas and include amongst others the
socio-demographic information of the population living in these regions. In this sec-
tion we look at regional diﬀerences of some selected variables concerning the market
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Figure 3.2: Maps: Market participation and contract terms
Sex work in Germany at the 2 digit zip code level. Darker colors represent higher values of the
variable in the given region. Source: Own representation.
(a) Total number of oﬀers
(b) Sold services relative to oﬀers (c) Auctions relative to all oﬀers
(d) Number of sellers per 1000
women
(e) Number of buyers per 1000 men
(f) Average hourly wages for vaginal
sex
(g) Average hourly wages for vaginal
sex relative to GDP per capita.
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of sex work, and start with market participation.
Figure 3.2a shows the absolute number of observations (sexual service oﬀers)
in our dataset. With an average of 1, 075 oﬀers per region, the lowest number of
oﬀers is found in D-02 Bautzen (14) and the highest in D-40 Duesseldorf (4310). In
general, the areas that are known to have a large market for sex workers (e.g., see
Eigendorf et al., 2013), are also in our dataset represented with a high number of
oﬀers (e.g., Berlin, Dresden, Frankfurt, Hanover, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart and
the Ruhr area). Not surprisingly, rural and less populated areas tend to have a lower
absolute number of oﬀers. Geographically  with some exceptions  in Southern
and Western Germany more than 30% of these oﬀers are sold, while in Northern
and Eastern Germany less than 30% are actually sold (Figure 3.2b). Especially in
Bavaria supply seems to match demand or vice versa.
In Figures 3.2d and 3.2e, the number of sellers and buyers per 1000 female and
male inhabitants respectively is presented. Again the most known areas also have
the highest relative number of sellers (e.g., Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Nuremberg,
Ruhr area), but in some areas it is actually the neighboring zip codes that have
the above average number of sellers (e.g., the areas around Frankfurt and Munich).
Concerning the relative number of buyers the picture is roughly the same and un-
surprising.17 Large cities and their direct surroundings have the highest relative
number of bidders.
Figure 3.2c shows that the use of auctions to sell sexual services is quite hetero-
geneous among regions. On average, half of the oﬀers are made as auctions and half
of them at a ﬁxed price (see above). In contrast, there is a clear pattern for average
hourly wages (Figure 3.2f). Hourly wages range from 47 Euro (D-02 Bautzen) to 198
Euro (D-98 Suhl). With the exception of D-20 Elmshorn (near Hamburg), the most
expensive regions are found in the South and the West of Germany. Interestingly,
prices are higher in the regions surrounding Munich than in Munich itself. The
geographical pattern changes if the hourly wage is corrected for the regional GDP
(Figure 3.2g). On the one hand, some regions even stay relatively expensive com-
pared to living cost (e.g., Cologne, Freiburg, etc.), but  again with some exceptions
 sexual services in East German regions are relatively expensive compared to the
local GDP. We study these regional wage diﬀerences in more detail in chapter 6.
Another dimension are contract and seller attributes. Figure 3.3 shows the share
of oﬀers that contain certain types of sexual services. As in the whole sample, 92%
of the oﬀers include vaginal sex (see above) meaning that in most areas the share
of oﬀers including sex is very high. In only 10 regions it is below 75%. The total
share of sellers oﬀering anal sex is 16%, but in a ﬁfth of the regions higher than 27%.
The overall rate of services oﬀered without protection (condom use) is quite low in
17Note that we do not know where the buyer lives, but only where the seller oﬀers the service he
bids on. Hence, the relative number of buyers is actually the number of buyer bidding in a certain
area, relative to the men actually living there.
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Figure 3.3: Maps: Contract and seller attributes
Sex work in Germany at the 2 digit zip code level. Darker colors represent higher values of the
variable in the given region. Source: Own representation.
(a) Share of sellers oﬀering vaginal
sex
(b) Share of sellers oﬀering anal sex(c) Share of sellers oﬀering unpro-
tected sex
(d) Average age of a seller (e) Students relative to all sellers
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the sample (4%, see above), but in a ﬁfth of the regions it actually exceeds 6%. In
D-20 Hamburg it is 20% and in D-39 Magdeburg it is even 38%. In the 18 months,
for which data is available, sexual services were oﬀered without protection 108 and
198 times in these two regions, respectively. Figure 3.3d shows that the sellers' age
is very heterogeneously distributed. There is a slight tendency of a higher average
age in the East German regions (e.g., 46 years in Potsdam), but also in some West
German regions the average age is relatively high (e.g., 40 years in Bremen). One last
attribute that is of interest in a geographical sense is the share of sellers that claim
to be students (Figure 3.3e). Interestingly, this share is not systematically higher in
University cities, in their surroundings or in regions with more young women. For
example, in Berlin, Frankfurt, Freiburg, Hannover, Mainz and Munich, the share of
students is higher than on average, but other famous university towns do not stand
out at all. To sum up, concerning sex work, there is much heterogeneity between
the 95 regions in Germany.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have given a short overview over the legal status of sex work in
Germany and existing theories and datasets. In the presentation of the descriptive
statistics, it has become clear, that the "www.gesext.de" dataset is very unique.
It is the only dataset based on actual contract data in a developed country not
created by surveying sex workers, but by extracting data directly from a match-
maker platform. According to the information contained in the dataset, sex work in
Germany is heterogeneous between sex workers and regions. In the next chapters
we investigate diﬀerent aspects of this otherwise hidden market.
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Chapter 4
Endogenous risk taking and physical
appearance of sex workers
4.1 Introduction
While some countries ban the supply (e.g., Ireland, United States) or the demand
(e.g., Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United States) of sexual services
for pay, such contracts are legal elsewhere (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Brasil, Germany,
Hungary, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom; see Cho et al., 2012). Inde-
pendent of legality, there is abundant evidence of existing sex work  mainly supplied
by female workers to male customers  all over the world. Over the last decade sup-
ply has shifted towards the internet. Street prostitution and brothels still exist and
make up a large part of the market, but with the anonymity of the internet, platforms
mediating between providers and customers of sexual services oﬀer a cheap way to
advertise sexual services and have become more and more important (Cunningham
& Kendall, 2011b). It is hard to get reliable data for this market (for the "online"
and, especially, the "oine" segment), but estimates for the whole market speak of
up to 400,000 women working full or part-time in the sector, earning per year up to
14.5 billion Euro or 0.4% of the GDP in Germany alone (Reichel & Topper, 2003).
A key issue in professional sex work is health protection for all involved parties.
Recent research provides evidence that a signiﬁcant fraction of sexual services are
provided without protection (e.g., Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005; Cunningham
& Kendall, 2010b; de la Torre et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2011; Arunachalam &
Shah, 2013), thereby encountering a risk of genital and other diseases such as HIV.1
Most of the literature acknowledges (directly or indirectly) that risk-taking through
the oﬀering of unprotected sex is endogenous. Sex workers had been found to be
willing to oﬀer sex without condom more likely, if a price premium was paid (see
Gertler et al., 2005; de la Torre et al., 2010) or the opportunity costs were high.
1Throughout this chapter, we use the terms "risk-taking", "unprotected sex", and "sex without
condom" interchangeably.
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E.g., de la Torre et al. (2010), Robinson et al. (2011), and Wilson (2012) showed
that sex workers oﬀered such services more frequently after spells of bad ﬁnancial
shape, negative income shocks, or illness (and an associated loss of income). This
evidence is consistent with the larger prevalence of unprotected sex oﬀerings in the
"oine" (e.g., street prostitution) relative to the "online" (internet) market, since
suppliers in the former segment of the market tend to be less educated, to charge
lower prices, and to depend more on the income generated from their services than
ones in the latter segment (see Cunningham & Kendall, 2011b).
The average price premia reported in the aforementioned work range from about
9% for Kenyan sex workers in Robinson et al. (2011) and Ecuadorian sex workers
in Arunachalam & Shah (2013) over 23% in Gertler et al. (2005) to 30% in de la
Torre et al. (2010) for Mexican sex workers to 194-376% for Indian sex workers in
Rao et al. (2003). It is worth mentioning that, among those studies, the one by
Rao et al. (2003) was the only one to be able to randomize their subject pool about
condom usage, and it found the largest price premium among all of them.
Some recent research on the size and the determinants of the price premium
for unprotected sex argues that the opportunity costs of denying such services (i.e.,
the economic incentives of supplying them) are larger for less attractive sex workers.
Gertler et al. (2005) provide a theoretical rationale for this line of work. Their model
suggests that attractiveness raises the bargaining power of sex workers, whereby
attractive sex workers are able to charge a higher price for sex services in general
and also a higher premium for unprotected sex than less attractive ones.2 This
shows in higher price premia for unprotected sex oﬀerings of more attractive sex
workers (see Gertler et al., 2005) and in lower price premia for obese sex workers
(see Chang & Weng, 2012). However, the associated evidence assumes that sellers'
choice to oﬀer unprotected sex practice is random.3
This chapter utilizes data on the oﬀering and contracting of sexual services via
the internet through www.gesext.de.4 We downloaded all contracted services of fe-
male suppliers between January 16 of 2011 and September 9 of 2012 from this
database. In this study, we focus on all contracts where the weight and oﬀered ser-
vices of the worker are known and a contract has been concluded at a known price.5
2To some extent, the arguments in this line of research are consistent with the evidence that
economic success and physical appearance are related to each other (see Hamermesh & Biddle,
1994; Fletcher, 2009; Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006; Johnston (2010).
3Gertler et al. (2005) demonstrate in their Table 5 that the practice of unprotected sex can
be explained by sex worker and client characteristics, but their price comparisons of protected
and unprotected sex practices only account for endogenous selection based on time-invariant sex
worker characteristics. (Chang & Weng, 2012, p.482) acknowledge that their "analysis may suﬀer
from endogeneity bias because condom use and prostitute price may be correlated due to some
unobserved common factors."
4While this is only one such platform in Germany, it accounts for an annual revenue of about
4 million Euros for sexual services oﬀered by females only.
5When rescinding a concluded contract, the contracted price is still due. This can be enforced
since customers must fully reveal their identity to the platform owner. 15% of the contracted price
is generally due as a fee for the platform services.
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We estimate the price premia in contracts about unprotected sex, emphasizing the
importance of controlling for endogeneity. We propose an identiﬁcation strategy
which relies on two alternative types of instruments  one related to the frequency
of prior unprotected sex oﬀerings by other sex workers in the same region where
a given contract was made and one related to personal characteristics of other sex
workers oﬀering prior unprotected sex in the same region where a given contract was
made. In line with earlier work, we ﬁnd that oﬀering unprotected sexual services
raises hourly wages of sex workers. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Rao et al. (2003),
we ﬁnd that non-random selection (of sex workers and clients) into unprotected sex
leads to a downward bias of the risk premium. Considering self-selection into risk-
taking suggests that the risk premium on non-protection is more than twice as large
as when assuming random risk-taking. We estimate the risk premium at about 91%
of the average hourly wage. However, it is interesting to see that the magnitude
of the premium is smaller than in Rao et al. (2003), since we analyse a sample of
sex workers from a developed country and in the "online" segment, where at least
the purely economic opportunity costs should be relatively high. Apart from the
mentioned ones, reasons for the quantitative diﬀerence between the results in this
chapter and the one of Rao et al. (2003) may be that medication to treat HIV is
more easily available and aﬀordable in Germany than in India and that the time
periods are rather diﬀerent between the two studies (pertaining to 1993 in Rao et al.,
2003, and to 2011-2012 in this study). Interestingly and in contrast to the results in
Gertler et al. (2005) and Chang & Weng (2012), the results in this chapter suggest
that appearance aﬀects the hourly wage but not the risk premium on unprotected
sex.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the novel database on online sex contracts used in this chapter. Section 4.3 describes
the identiﬁcation strategy and the econometric framework. Section 4.4 summarizes
the estimation results, and the last section concludes.
4.2 Data
Before introducing the data-set employed in detail, we should emphasize two fea-
tures. First, as any other study on sex workers, data on this type of work are
generally selected in the sense that census-type data on sex workers are not avail-
able. Data will not be available, unless sex workers are willing to participate in
a ﬁeld study (as in Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005; de la Torre et al., 2010;
Robinson et al., 2011; Chang & Weng, 2012; Arunachalam & Shah, 2013) or they
come forward with an online posting and deliver information without knowing (as in
this study and also in Moﬀatt & Peters, 2004; Cunningham & Kendall, 2011b). Sec-
ond, as opposed to "oine" sex workers, "online" sex workers as used in this study
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tend to be better educated, ﬁnancially less dependent, and part of the higher-price
segment of the market (see Cunningham & Kendall, 2010b).
We employ digitally collected data on the oﬀering and contracting of sexual
services by females via the internet through www.gesext.de. When making an oﬀer
on this platform sellers describe themselves and their services (including, e.g., notes
on condom use, duration of the meeting, the location, ...) and can oﬀer sexual
services either as a second price auction or at a ﬁxed price. While in the ﬁrst case
the highest bidder has to pay the second highest bid, in the latter case the ﬁrst bidder
has to pay the ﬁxed price. The meeting then takes place at a predeﬁned place (hotel,
ﬂat, ...) and the payment is normally made in cash. It is unknown if the seller and
buyer actually meet and engage in sexual services, but when rescinding a concluded
contract, for the customer the full contracted price is due. For the seller 15% of
the contracted price is generally due as a fee for the platform services. This can be
enforced since customers must fully reveal their identity to the platform owner.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Binary
Log price per hour 4.9970 0.7698 no
Risk-taking 0.0721 0.2587 yes
Overweight 0.2373 0.4254 yes
Height is provided 0.5815 0.4933 yes
Height in cm if height is provided 166.6254 6.0342 no
Height-squared in cm if height is provided 27,800.4400 1,994.4560 no
Age is provided 0.4098 0.4918 yes
Age in years if age is provided 29.7913 8.6382 no
Age-squared in years if age is provided 962.1291 583.7763 no
First-time supplier 0.0522 0.2224 yes
Single 0.0828 0.2756 yes
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this
chapter. The total number of observations (transactions) is 16,583 and the
underlying number of sex workers is 2,517.
In general everybody can oﬀer services on this platform, but the average price
of about 148 Euro shows that this platform mainly covers a premium segment of
the market.6 We downloaded all contracted services of female suppliers between
January 16 of 2011 and September 9 of 2012 from this database and focus on all
oﬀers where a contract has been concluded at a known price.
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 provide descriptive evidence of the hourly wage of 2,517
sex workers oﬀering sex for pay at www.gesext.de between January 17 of 2012 and
September 9 of 2012 through altogether 16,583 individual contracts. We classify
workers with a body mass index of more than 25 as overweight. Some of the work-
ers do not provide weight and height but only pictures. For those, we classify them
6Döring (2014) writes that the average price for an one hour session with a indoor sex worker
in Germany is about 100 Euro.
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Figure 4.1: Kernel densities
The ﬁgure presents the kernel densities for hourly wages of overweight/non-overweight by risk-
taking/non-risk-taking female sex workers in Germany. Source: own representation.
as being overweight or not, depending on their physical appearance (this was done
by six students between March 2012 and September 2012).7 For all of the transac-
tions we know whether workers oﬀer unprotected services (sex without a condom) or
not. Of the 16,583 contracts, 3,935 involve overweight sexual workers and 12,648 do
not, and 1,196 involve unprotected service oﬀerings while 15,387 do not. Interest-
ingly, about 5.5% of the contracts oﬀered by overweight workers involve unprotected
service, while 7.7% are unprotected for non-overweight workers. Table 4.1 provides
further information on characteristics of sex workers and on the contract environ-
ment in the database. For instance, about 58% of the concluded contracts involve
workers who provide information about their height and, on average, those are about
167 centimeters tall. In about 41% of the contracts sex workers mention their age
and, on average, those are about 30 years old. About 5% of the contracts involve
workers who indicate that they are unexperienced (they are eﬀectively ﬁrst-time
suppliers on that platform), and in 8% of the contracts workers indicate that they
7Of all 16,583 individual contracts covered, weight was imputed by students into the four
categories "obese" (corresponding to a body-mass index, BMI, of higher than 30) an estimate BMI,
"overweight" (corresponding to a BMI of higher than 25 up to 30), "normal weight" (corresponding
to a BMI of higher than 18.5 and up to 25), "underweight" (corresponding to a BMI of up to 18.5)
for 11,630 transactions. In order to avoid a measurement error to the largest possible extent, this
categorization was done twice, by diﬀerent students. Notice that subjective classiﬁcation schemes
of sex workers' appearances had also been used, e.g., by (Moﬀatt & Peters, 2004), (Gertler et al.,
2005), (Cunningham & Kendall, 2011b).
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are single. The average hourly wage across all contracts is about 148 Euros (about
5.00 in logs) with a standard deviation of about 2.16 Euros (0.77 in logs).8
Towards accounting for the endogeneity of risk-taking (contracting unprotected
sexual services without condom), we propose two types of instruments both of which
measure features of contracts that had been concluded by sex workers other than
the one involved in and happening prior to transaction i but in the same two-digit
district: one type of instrument is based on the prior average risk-taking of other sex
workers, and one is based on the average height of other sex workers. To form two
identifying instrumental variables, for either type of instruments, we use the value
of the instrument, which is i-speciﬁc, as well as its squared value. The instruments
are likely exogenous as long there is some inter-temporal habit formation, i.e., if
sex workers adopt strategies of others in the same neighborhood in the past. The
second type of instrument (based on others' height) is relevant and adequate when
two things hold: ﬁrst there is habit formation over time and height matters for
risk-taking.
Figure 4.1 displays the distributions of log hourly wages for the four cells in
the matrix overweight/non-overweight by risk-taking/non-risk-taking. The ﬁgure
illustrates that the average hourly wages of non-overweight risk-taking suppliers
is higher than that of non-risk-taking suppliers. Especially, the right tail of the
former distribution is fatter than that of the latter distribution. These features are
somewhat less clear-cut for overweight suppliers who clearly make up a smaller part
of the overall distribution. However, we should bear in mind that the distributions
are unconditional on explanatory variables and do not provide for direct inference
about the relative importance of risk-taking on hourly wages of female sex workers.
4.3 Estimation methods
One particular goal of this section is to shed light on the diﬀerences between re-
gressions which treat Risk− takingi as exogenous  i.e., assuming that sex workers
do not self-select into unprotected sex  and ones which consider Risk − takingi
to be endogenous upon self-selection. For the latter, we will generally pursue an
instrumental-variable (IV) two-stage least-squares (2SLS) strategy which takes the
binary nature of Risk− takingi into account. Procedures for such models had been
suggested, among others, by Heckman (1978), Maddala (1983), Heckman & Vytlacil
(1999), Vella & Verbeek (1999), and Wooldridge (2002). Speciﬁcally, Wooldridge
(2002, pp. 621-633)) discusses the assumptions and suggests four alternative para-
8Clearly, all of the information contained in the online postings is self-reported. Hence, sex
workers might strategically misreport (see Plankey et al., 1997; and Cawley, 2014; for a general
discussion of misreporting). However, the contracts are concluded based on this information pro-
vided and they become legally eﬀective. Moreover, most sex workers are rated by earlier customers,
and misreporting would show in the ratings. The ratings do not indicate strategic misreporting on
average.
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metric procedures based on those (on pages 623, 626, 629f., and 631, respectively).
We will rely on such approaches, where the average treatment eﬀect  in our case,
of Risk − takingi  may vary with some covariates  here, Overweighti.
For the approaches considered here, we will maintain the following set of as-
sumptions. (Instrument exogeneity and Conditional mean independence.) First, we
will assume that at least one instrument Instrumentsi exists which can be used to
model the probability that Risk − takingi = 1,
P (Risk−takingi = 1) = Φ(Overweighti, Controlsi, Instrumentsi) = Φi, where the
instrument is uncorrelated with the unobservable determinants of  i.e., the stochas-
tic term on  the dependent variable of interest, e.g., ln(HourlyWage)i. Denoting
this stochastic term by εi, the formal requirement is E(Instrumentsiεi) = 0 and
assuming that Φi can be estimated, the prediction Φˆi is a natural instrument for
Risk − takingi (see Wooldridge (2002, p. 626)). Conditional on Overweighti, a
set of control variables entering the outcome equation, Controlsi, which include a
constant, and the set of instruments, Instrumentsi, Risk− takingi is then random.
Formally, when using superscript 1 for Risk − takingi = 1 and superscript 0 for
Risk − takingi = 0 (only one of which is observed for transaction i), the expecta-
tions E(εsi |Overweighti, Controlsi, Instrumentsi) = E(εsi |Overweighti, Controlsi)
for s ∈ {0, 1}. (Joint normality of the disturbances on Risk − takingi and outcome
such as ln(HourlyWage)i.) Under normality of the latent variable determining the
desirability of Risk − takingi = 1, the function Φi is the cumulative normal dis-
tribution function and Φˆi is the prediction that P (Risk − takingi = 1). Under
bivariate normality of the random component of ln(HourlyWage)i and the random
component in Φi, say, νi, the prediction of a probit model of P (Risk− takingi = 1)
can be used as an instrument for Risk− takingi = 1 (see Wooldridge (2002, p. 623),
Procedure 18.1). Alternatively, one can use a control function using the probability
density function, φ(Overweighti, Controlsi, Instrumentsi) = φi, based on the la-
tent process for P (Risk−takingi = 1) in addition to instrumenting (see Wooldridge
(2002, p. 629f), Procedure 18.3).
The same assumptions support models where the eﬀect of Risk − takingi on
outcome, e.g., ln(HourlyWage)i, varies with some or all observable elements in
(Overweighti, Controlsi). In light of earlier work on the matter (see Chang &Weng,
2012), we will consider cases where the average treatment eﬀect of Risk − takingi
varies with Overweighti only. Suppose that the eﬀect of Risk − takingi of interest
on outcome is βRisk − takingi + γRisk − takingi × Overweighti (when omitting
other eﬀects for brevity). In that case, the average treatment eﬀect of Risk −
takingi is βRisk − takingi + γOverweight, where Overweight = E(Overweighti)
can be estimated by the sample mean. Wooldridge suggests demeaning Overweighti
in the interaction term and using ˜Overweighti ≡ Overweighti − Overweight in
βRisk − takingi + γRisk − takingi × ˜Overweighti, so that β measures the average
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treatment eﬀect of Risk − takingi, since E( ˜Overweighti) = 0. Then Φˆ(·) and
Φˆ(·) × ˜Overweighti are the suitable instruments for Risk − takingi and Risk −
takingi × ˜Overweighti, respectively (see Wooldridge (2002, pp. 626 and 629)).
Consequently, we run regressions per transaction i = 1; ...; 16, 583 of the form
ln(HourlyWage)i = βRisk − takingi + γRisk − takingi × ˜Overweighti
+ δOverweighti + ζControlsi + (ηφˆi) + εi. (4.1)
Overweight ≡ 1
16, 583
16,583∑
i=1
Overweighti,
˜Overweighti ≡ Overweighti −Overweight. (4.2)
Notice that the interaction term Risk−takingi× ˜Overweighti involves the demeaned
value while the main eﬀect involves the un-demeaned value of Overweighti as in
Wooldridge (2002, pp. 626 and 629). The term ηφˆi is the control function based
on the estimated density φˆi, which will not be included in all models. Models that
exclude ηφˆi correspond to what Wooldridge (2002, p. 626) calls Procedure 18.2,
whereas ones that include ηφˆi correspond to what Wooldridge (2002, p. 629) calls
Procedure 18.3.
We run three pairs of versions of (4.1), three of them excluding γRisk−takingi×
˜Overweighti and the other ones including it. Two models assume random assign-
ment of sex workers into risk-taking whereby β could be estimated through ordinary
least squares (OLS) on (4.1). Four models assume self-selection into risk-taking and
aim at avoiding an associated bias by using instrumental variables in two-stage
least squares (2SLS) regressions as described above. For the latter, we estimate a
probability model of the form
P (Risk − takingi = 1) = Φ([Instrumentsi, Overweighti, Controlsi]θ + νi), (4.3)
where we use two variants of Instrumentsi as described in Section 4.2. In the main
part of the chapter, we employ Instrumentsi = (RegionHistoryi, RegionHistory2i ),
where RegionHistoryi is the average value (probability) of risk-taking by other sex
workers in the same two-digit zip code between January 16 of 2012 and Septem-
ber 8 of 2012 and at least one day prior to contract i and RegionHistory2i is the
squared value thereof. The vector θ is a conformable parameter vector on all the
explanatory variables in the probit model (including ﬁxed eﬀects for 78 two-digit
zip codes). RegionHistoryi and RegionHistory2i are valid instruments, if other
sex workers than the one oﬀering transaction i in the same district, where i is
contracted, do not anticipate or are inﬂuenced by Risk − takingi. Alternatively,
we use Instrumentsi = (OthersHeighti, OthersHeight2i ), where OthersHeighti is
the average value reported height by other sex workers in the same two-digit zip
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code between January 16 of 2011 and September 8 of 2012 and at least one day
prior to contract i and OthersHeight2i is the squared value thereof. Quite clearly,
OthersHeighti and OthersHeight2i cannot be inﬂuenced by Risk− takingi and, as
long as there is some contagion in Risk − takingi, we would expect characteristics
of other sex workers  in particular, in a lagged fashion  to be suitable instruments
for Risk − takingi (see Kuersteiner & Prucha, 2013 as well as Badinger & Egger,
2014). Usual standard errors are calculated using the observed information matrix
(OIM).
4.4 Regression results
4.4.1 Main results
The results for the probit and six linear regression models are summarized in Table
4.2. The probit results indicate that overweight suppliers tend to oﬀer unprotected
services less likely than others. This is in some contrast with earlier work which
pointed to a compensating role of risk-taking for personal appearance. However, the
result is consistent with the frequencies of contracts in the 2 × 2 overweight/non-
overweight and the risk-taking/non-risk-taking matrix as reported above. Moreover,
there is some evidence of younger providers to be more likely to oﬀer unprotected
services. Finally, contagion is a strong factor in risk-taking: the more others oﬀered
unprotected services in the same region (at least one day) prior to the time con-
tract i was concluded, the more likely will the worker involved in contract i oﬀer
unprotected services as well. The explanatory variables have a highly signiﬁcant
joint impact in the probit model and also the other models. Notice that all esti-
mates reported pertain to regression coeﬃcients (parameters) rather than marginal
eﬀects. Hence, the coeﬃcients on continuous variables measure marginal eﬀects on
the latent desirability of or net beneﬁt from risk-taking, a variable which has full
support in real space between minus and plus inﬁnity.
The linear regression models all suggest that risk-taking raises the hourly wage of
sex workers while being overweight reduces it. There is a premium on providing in-
formation about height or age, and there is a tendency of customers to favor medium-
tall and younger, especially inexperienced (ﬁrst-time) suppliers. This chapter's focus
is on the magnitude of the impact of Risk−takingi and Risk−takingi× ˜Overweighti
as captured by the parameter estimates βˆ and γˆ in the OLS and 2SLS models.
First of all, it stands out that βˆ in the OLS models is less than half of the size
of the counterpart 2SLS models. An OLS parameter of 0.4958 corresponds to a
semi-elasticity of about 100[exp(0.4958) − 1] ' 64% for an hourly wage premium
of risk-taking. According to the same model, there is a semi-elasticity of being
overweight of about 100[exp(−0.2588) − 1] ' −23% which is raised (rather than
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reduced) to −37% when oﬀering unprotected services.9
Second, clearly the 2SLS regressions suggest that the parameters of the OLS
models are biased. The instruments work well. The F-statistics for the relevance of
the single identifying instrument Φˆi forRisk−takingi in the models excludingRisk−
takingi× ˜Overweighti are about 599 and 297 in the ﬁrst stage, and the ones for the
two instruments Φˆi and Φˆi × ˜Overweighti in the other ﬁrst-stage 2SLS models are
between 163 and 472. Neither one of the estimated 2SLS models suggests that risk-
taking has a diﬀerent eﬀect on hourly wages of overweight versus other suppliers (i.e.,
statistically, γˆ is not distinguishable from zero). This renders the models without the
interaction term preferable for eﬃciency reasons. The model including the control
function ηφˆi seems preferable from an econometric point of view, as it eliminates an
endogeneity bias under less stringent assumptions than the 2SLS model without the
control function. In the model with the control function, the premium on risk-taking
is about 100[exp(1.0673)− 1] ' 91%. Obviously this more than compensates being
overweight for the average female sex worker in the data, which reduces the hourly
wage according to the same speciﬁcation by 100[exp(−0.2579)− 1] ' −23%.
4.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, we assess the sensitivity of the 2SLS results along four lines.
First, we assess the possible impact of using weight information that had been
imputed by students. For this, we exclude all transactions, where the weight in-
formation was imputed or the self-reported body-mass index (BMI) of sex work-
ers was in the interval 24 < BMIi < 26 (referred to as model 7A). Alterna-
tively, we interact the two risk measures with a binary indicator variable which
is unity if the weight information was self-reported and zero if it was imputed by
students based on the provided photographs. Then, we include four risk mea-
sures  the original ones and the ones that were interacted with the aforemen-
tioned binary indicator variable (referred to as model 7B). Furthermore we run
regressions, where Instrumentsi = (OthersHeighti, OthersHeight2i ) rather than
Instrumentsi = (RegionHistoryi, RegionHistory
2
i ) are used (referred to as model
7C). Finally, we present results of a 2SLS model with sex-worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
(referred to as model 7D). The parameters corresponding to these regressions are
reported in the aforementioned order as columns (7A)-(7D) in Table 4.3, and they
should be compared to column (7) in Table 4.2.
The results from those sensitivity checks may be summarized as follows. First of
all, the results for the extreme-BMI subsample in column (7A) of Table 4.3 suggest
that the main eﬀect and interaction eﬀect are statistically insigniﬁcant. However,
9The correlation of the disturbances between latent process of the probability of risk-taking
and the outcome (wage) equation is negative. Hence, the downward bias of the OLS parameter
on risk taking suggests that risk-taking sex workers have on average lower gains from risk-taking
than non-risk-taking ones.
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these results are based on only 3,405 rather than 16,583 observations and only half
of the regions (2-digit zip codes) included in the full sample are still represented
in the corresponding subsample. Secondly, the results in column (7B) suggest that
both in the full sample and in the subsample of contracts with self-reported weight
only there is a statistically signiﬁcant and positive main eﬀect and a statistically
insigniﬁcant interaction eﬀect. The interaction term of risk and the self-reporting
indicator variable enters negatively. Hence, in the self reported sample the risk
premium is smaller than in the full sample, but it is still positive. Thirdly, with
the alternative instrument set in column (7C), the results are similar to the ones
in Table 4.2. Finally, with sex-worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, none of the risk-taking
eﬀects  neither the main eﬀect nor the interaction term  is statistically signiﬁcant.
The latter ﬂows from the low degree of variation of risk-taking within sex workers
over time. However, as reported in the context of the discussion of Table 4.2, the
Hausman test statistic does not support the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator relative to the
random eﬀects model, since estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects involves an enormous loss
of degrees of freedom, while the parameter vectors between the two model types are
not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Notice that one could estimate the two-stage least-squares models alternatively
by using a ﬁrst-stage linear-probability model. Doing so results in a p-value for the
Sargan over-identiﬁcation test of 0.1358 (hence, instrument validity is not rejected
in spite of a high instrument relevance as reﬂected in an F-statistic on the joint rel-
evance of 46.43) and the following parameters (standard errors) of interest: 1.0573
(0.1669) for Risk-taking; 0.8702 (0.3096) for Risk-taking× ˜Overweight, and -0.3173
(0.0227) for Overweight.10 However, we should be very careful with the interpreta-
tion of these results, since the standard errors and test statistics are all biased due
to the limited-dependent-variable character of Risk-taking and the involved corner
solutions (see Wooldridge (2002, p. 637)).
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyses the price premium on unprotected sex oﬀerings by sex workers
in Germany. The data used for the study come from a large online database, where
the authors downloaded the universe of transactions between January 16 of 2011
and September 9 of 2012. With an average hourly wage of about 140 Euros, the
data at hand feature in the premium segment of the market. The issue of self-
selection into risky behavior through unprotected sex received particular attention
in the study. Using time-lagged characteristics of sex transactions by other sex
workers in the geographical neighborhood, we found that disregarding endogenous
10The other model results are available from the authors upon request. Notice that further test
statistics suggest that the instruments do not under-identify and are now weak. Yet, as with the
other test statistics, these are biased with limited dependent endogenous right-hand-side variables.
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risk-taking leads to down-ward biased risk-premia. The premium on unprotected
services in the data is estimated at about 91% of the average hourly wage. There
is no evidence in the data that over-weight sex workers receive a lower positive
premium on unprotected services than other sex workers.
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Chapter 5
Fun and games: How soccer games
and conventions raise the demand for
paid sex
5.1 Introduction
Earlier work on the economic eﬀects of events at large comes to mixed conclusions
regarding the desirability of hosting such events from a purely economic standpoint.
This chapter sheds light on eﬀects of such events on a margin in an economy's
shadow: the demand for and supply of paid sexual services. While sexual services
for pay are illegal  for customers and/or providers  in some countries (e.g., Finland,
France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, the United States), they are not in others (e.g.,
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom). Cho
et al. (2012) provide an excellent overview on the legality and illegality of sexual
services for pay around the globe.
This chapter relates to three distinct literatures: the one on economic conse-
quences of sports events, the one on the economic consequences of trade fairs, and
the one on the demand for and supply of sexual services for pay. The chapter uses
a unique, novel data-set on the oﬀers of, bidding about, and purchases of sexual
services for pay through an online platform in Germany.1 The data-set allows to
geo- and time-reference the individual transactions and provides rich information.
This permits matching the services oﬀered and purchased with data on home and
away games of local soccer teams in a region, with global soccer events (such as
the European Championship), and of trade fairs. To evaluate the results of this
chapter, it is useful to provide a short overview of the main ﬁndings of the three
related literatures.
First of all, work on the economic eﬀects of sports events comes to rather mixed
1The dataset has also been used in two other studies. See chapter 4 (Egger & Lindenblatt,
2015a) and 6 (Egger & Lindenblatt, 2015c).
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conclusions. Only a small body of work focuses on regular events (such as national
or regional league soccer, football, basketball, or baseball games), while most of the
related work focuses on mega events (such as the soccer World Cup or European
Championship). Only modest economic eﬀects tend to be found for smaller, regular
events, and positive eﬀects occur mostly  if at all  for tourism services rather
than retailing (see Allmers & Maennig, 2009).2 Even the evidence on the economic
eﬀects of large, supranational soccer events is mixed (Rose & Spiegel, 2011, is a rare
example of relatively large economic eﬀects  on trade ﬂows; Baade & Matheson,
2004; Hagn & Maennig, 2009; Feddersen & Maennig, 2012; Ferris et al., 2012; Lamla
et al., 2012; for evidence on quite modest eﬀects on other economic outcomes).
Second, the evidence on the economic eﬀects of trade fairs seems to be rather
positive. Related research points to signiﬁcant eﬀects on tourism services and even
retailing (see Tourism Vancouver, 2007; Penzkofer, 2008; Bathelt & Spigel, 2012).
Third, the sales of sexual services has been shown to be driven by standard
market forces such as the size of demand (population, average income, etc.) and the
size of supply (lack of outside options for sexual workers, poverty, etc.). Della Giusta
et al. (2008, 2009b) provide a model and analysis of the determinants of sexual work.
Moﬀatt & Peters (2004) provide thorough evidence on the pricing of paid sexual
services. Interestingly, earlier work found evidence of only a moderate impact of
mega sports events on the demand for sex work (see The German Delegation to the
Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime, 2007; Richter et al., 2012), while it
pointed to large eﬀects of political conventions (see Cunningham & Kendall, 2011a).
Although there is a lot of evidence on the inﬂuence of tourism on the demand for sex
work (Oppermann, 1998; Ryan & Hall, 2005), actual data on this speciﬁc issue seems
to be hard to get.3 Tannahill (1992), Bullough & Bullough (1987), and Sanger (2006)
provide an overview of the determinants and consequences of sex work in history.
Contrary to other spheres of the economy, we ﬁnd rather big eﬀects of events
on the sales of paid sex. In particular, those eﬀects tend to be larger for bigger
events (e.g., European Championship soccer games) than for smaller ones (e.g.,
standard soccer-league games or the average trade fair), and, for sports events, they
are speciﬁc to outcomes (e.g., transaction numbers supplied vs. demanded and,
alternatively, pricing). Using micro-level evidence based on transaction-level data
from an internet platform on sex for sale in Germany, we document that, at the level
of the zip code, events stimulate the extent of transactions oﬀered and, in particular,
demanded, and they even induce eﬀects on the pricing of sexual services for pay.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a short
overview of some hypotheses emerging from earlier work on the matter. Section 5.3
2This is consistent with moderate eﬀects of such events on tax revenues (see Baade & Matheson,
2004). Moreover, some research sheds even light on quite signiﬁcant negative economic eﬀects in
case of losses at ball game events (see Priks, 2010; Berument & Ceylan, 2012).
3As sex work is legal in Germany and illegal in some neighboring countries, even Germany has
become a "sex tourism" destination.
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introduces the database the results in this chapter are based upon, Section 5.4
summarizes the estimation strategy and results, and the last section concludes.
5.2 Hypotheses
Economic theory would suggest that events, and, especially, bigger events, lead to a
bigger number of possible customers of such services and, hence, they should raise
the price of supplied services  in case of some constraints thereon  temporar-
ily. Furthermore, soccer events inﬂuence people's sentiments (Edmans et al., 2007).
According to Della Giusta et al., 2008, 2009b, this eﬀect is mitigated to some ex-
tent since the consumption and supply of sexual services is deemed immoral, and
the associated stigmatisation of the involved agents constrains the market outcome.
However, an increase in local demand for such services still means a deterioration of
the outside options to the suppliers such that one would expect an increase in the
transactions of sexual services for pay at times of big events.
Especially, with sports events we might expect direct (local or home) and indirect
(away) eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we expect a potentially diﬀerential eﬀects of home and
away sports events on home team fans as such and also on them versus on opponent
team fans. For similar reasons local versus global sports events might diﬀer in
their eﬀects on the demand for sexual services, since the attachment of local fans
to diﬀerent events, and the number of persons following those events might diﬀer.
Moreover, there might be a diﬀerential eﬀect even among fans of the home team
with home events (ones that watch the game on television versus ones watching it in
the stadium or a public place). Finally, we would expect eﬀects to be diﬀerential for
won and lost games. Hence, the nature of an event itself may have an impact on the
potential demand for sexual services for pay. For that reason, we distinguish between
alternative types of sports (soccer) events and allow them to trigger diﬀerent eﬀects
on the demand and supply of sexual services for pay.
Unlike sports events, conventions (e.g., trade fairs) should be expected to pri-
marily trigger local (at least, in-the-neighborhood) eﬀects on sexual work and its
consumption (Cunningham & Kendall, 2011a).
5.3 Data
In this chapter, we employ information on all services oﬀered through www.gesext.de,
an internet auction site that operates exactly as ebay, except that sellers can only
oﬀer sexual services and related activities. Sellers describe their services in a short
text (they give a self-description and a description of the services oﬀered, including
the duration) and can either oﬀer their services through a buy-it-now oﬀer at a ﬁxed
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price, through a second-price auction with a pre-determined end-time, or both.4 We
utilize information on all transactions administered by the platform between January
16 in 2011 and September 9 in 2012. Let us introduce a regional (2-digit zip-code)
index z = 1, ..., Z and a time (i.e., the day an auction ended or a buy-it-now oﬀer
was bought) index d = 1, ...D.5 Moreover, let us use index s = 1, ..., S to identify
each individual sexual service contract. Altogether, there are Z = 95 zip codes,
D = 572, days and S = 27, 967 services sales (i.e., completed transactions) covered
by the data. Another 58, 181 services were oﬀered but no buyer was willing to make
a contract. During the concerned time span, the total revenues from such sales of
sexual services by female providers at www.gesext.de amounted to 5.76 million Euros.
Data on spectators of soccer-league games were collected from www.transfermarkt.de
and numbers of trade-fair visitors from FKM, a trade fair service provider.
Table 5.1: Description of the generic outcomes and determinants of the supply and
demand of sex work for pay
Variable name Description
HourlyWageszd Hourly wage at which service s is bought in Euros
zipDailyOﬀerszd Number of auction and buy-it-now oﬀers of sexual services in z at d
zipDailySoldzd Number of auction and buy-it-now purchases of sexual services in z at d
zipDailyAuctionszd Number of auction oﬀers of sexual services in z at d
zipDailyAuctionsSoldzd Number of auction purchases of sexual services in z at d
SoccerMatchzd The home team of z plays on day d (1) or not (0)
HomeGamezd The home team of z plays a home game on day d (1) or not (0)
GameLostzd The home team of z looses the game on day d (1) or not (0)
LnNrSoccerVisitorszd Log number of spectators at soccer stadium in zip code z on day d
TradeFairzd A trade fair takes place in z on day d (1) or not (0)
LnNrTradeFairVisitorszd Log number of visitors at any trade fair in zip code z on day d
ECMatchd A European Championship match is played on day d by any team (1) or not (0)
ECMatchDEU d A European Championship match is played on day d by Germany (1) or not (0)
ECMatchDEULoosed Germany lost a European Championship match on day d (1) or not (0)
SoccerMatchNeighborZipzd The home team of z's neighboring zip code plays on day d (1) or not (0)
HomeGameNeighborZipzd The home team of z's neighboring zip code plays a home game
on day d (1) or not (0)
TradeFairNeighborZipzd A trade fair takes place in z' neighboring zip code on day d (1) or not (0)
DWeightszd The seller of s provides information on her weight (1) or not (0)
Overweightszd The seller of s is overweight (1) or not (0)
DHeightszd The seller of s provides information on her height (1) or not (0)
Heightszd The seller's height
Height2szd The seller's height squared
DAgeszd The seller of s provides information on her age (1) or not (0)
Ageszd The seller's age
Age2szd The seller's age squared
Firstszd The seller of s claims to be a ﬁrst-time supplier (1) or not (0)
Singleszd The seller of s claims to be single (1) or not (0)
Weekday FE A ﬁxed eﬀect for the weekday of d is included
Month FE A ﬁxed eﬀect for the month of d is included
Zip code FE A ﬁxed eﬀect for z is included
Notes: Indices s, z, and d refer to sold (or oﬀered) services, 2-digit zip codes, and days, respectively.
Table 5.1 describes the variables used in this chapter. There are two types
of variables, a generic outcome yszd and generic determinants thereof, xk,szd. As
4To obtain the data we used a self-written download program. Information on each transaction
was then extracted by students we hired.
5Buy-it-now prices should diﬀer from auction prices since a spatio-temporal equilibrium may
be found with an auction but not a price. In the presence of a variable elasticity along the demand
curve for sexual services, we would then also expect prices and demand to react diﬀerently to
shocks on buy-it-now versus auctioned transactions.
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generic outcomes, we consider the contracted hourly wage of a sexual service (Hourly-
Wageszd, the contracted price divided by the duration of the service oﬀered) and the
number of services contracted per zip code z and time d (AuctionsBuyItNowszd for
auctions as well as buy-it-now contracts; Auctionszd for auctions only). Among the
generic determinants, four types stand out, one related to soccer game events of
teams that have their home stadium in zip code z (SoccerMatchzd, HomeGamezd,
GameLostzd and LnNrSoccerVisitorszd ), one related to European Championship
soccer game events (three variables: ECMatchd, ECMatchDEU d and ECMatchDEU-
Loosed), one related to trade fairs held in zip code z at time s (TradeFair zd and
LnNrTradeFairVisitorszd), and one related to indirect eﬀects of such events on
neighboring zip codes (SoccerMatchNeighborZipzd, HomeGameNeighborZipzd, and
TradeFairNeighborZipzd). For identiﬁcation of the parameters on the event vari-
ables of particular interest, we condition on a number of seller-speciﬁc characteris-
tics (DWeightszd, Overweightszd, DHeightszd, Heightszd, Height2szd, DAgeszd, Ageszd,
Age2szd, Firstszd and Singleszd), time characteristics (weekday and month ﬁxed ef-
fects), as well as regional characteristics (zip-code ﬁxed eﬀects).
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
Sold services Oﬀered services
Dep. variables Type Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HourlyWageszd continuous 102.2847 57.4246
zipDailyOfferszd continuous 1.6567 2.2873
zipDailySoldzd continuous 0.5403 0.9788
zipDailyAuctionszd continuous 0.9151 1.4974
zipDailyAuctionsSoldzd continuous 0.2853 0.6753
Indep. variables Type Mean SD Mean SD
SoccerMatchzd binary 0.0609 0.2391 0.0569 0.2316
HomeGamezd binary 0.0309 0.1730 0.0287 0.1670
GameLostzd binary 0.0064 0.0797 0.0051 0.0711
TradeFairzd binary 0.0860 0.2804 0.0781 0.2683
ECMatchd binary 0.0296 0.1695 0.0331 0.1788
ECMatchDEUd binary 0.0075 0.0860 0.0078 0.0879
ECMatchDEULoosed binary 0.0001 0.0090 0.0001 0.0085
LnNrSoccerV isitorszd continuous 10.2097 1.1944 10.1484 1.4046
LnNrTradeFairV isitorszd continuous 8.2836 1.7430 8.1918 1.7371
SoccerMatchNeighborZipzd binary 0.1066 0.3086 0.0990 0.2987
HomeGameNeighborZipzd binary 0.0642 0.2452 0.0602 0.2380
TradeFairNeighborZipszd binary 0.1618 0.3683 0.1522 0.3592
DWeightszd binary 0.3235 0.4678 0.3534 0.4780
Overweightszd binary 0.2617 0.4396 0.1680 0.3739
DHeightszd binary 0.5954 0.4908 0.5954 0.4908
Heightszd continuous 166.9342 6.2472 166.7331 6.0491
Height2szd continuous 27906.0600 2083.8930 27836.5000 2003.7300
DAgeszd binary 0.6608 0.4735 0.6958 0.4601
Ageszd continuous 31.7944 9.0073 29.7270 8.3915
Age2szd continuous 1092.0150 626.8656 954.1062 567.2429
Firstszd discrete 0.0306 0.1724 0.0450 0.2073
Singleszd binary 0.0531 0.2242 0.0847 0.2785
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter. Indices
s, z, and d refer to sold (or oﬀered) services, 2-digit zip codes, and days, respectively. The total
number of services sold (oﬀered) is 27,967 (86,148) and the underlying number of service suppliers
is 3,206 (3,773). The total number of zip codes and days covered is 95, and the total number of
days covered is 572. The ﬁrst two columns correspond to sold services only, while Column 3 and 4
correspond to all services oﬀered.
Table 5.2 summarizes the ﬁrst and second moments of these dependent and in-
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dependent variables in use. We mainly utilize data on actually sold services of which
there are 27,967, covering 3,206 suppliers during the covered time span (columns 3
and 4). As can be seen from Column 2 of Table 5.2, six of the explanatory variables
are continuous while the others are binary determinants of generic outcome. On
average, contracted services are sold at about 102 Euros per hour. About 6% of the
services are oﬀered on the day a soccer team plays a game at home or elsewhere 
whose home stadium is located in the area of the respective 2-digit zip code. Hence,
about 3% of the services are oﬀered at 2-digit zip-code areas where a team plays
a home game.6 Roughly 3% of the services were oﬀered during game days of the
European Championship 2012, which was hosted in Ukraine and Poland. When the
German team played, less than 1% of the services were purchased. Nearly 9% of the
services were sold while a trade fair took place in the same 2-digit zip code area.7
About 3% and 5% of the sexual service suppliers claim to oﬀer services for the ﬁrst
time and to be single, respectively. The descriptive statistics are similar between
the samples of actually contracted (sold) and just oﬀered services.
Sports events and conventions are known to induce geographically bound eco-
nomic eﬀects. Clearly, the magnitude and the geographical reach of the eﬀects
depend on the size of those events, i.e., the number of spectators and visitors. We
would expect proportional eﬀects on the demand and supply of sexual services for
pay. In order to convey an idea about the geography and size of such events in
Germany, we prepared Figures 5.1a and 5.1b which display 2-digit zip codes8 in
darker shade, if the maximum size of a soccer-league team's stadium or the number
of trade fair visitors is larger, respectively.
The ﬁgures suggest that larger agglomerations (such as Munich, Berlin, Ham-
burg, Frankfurt, and some cities in Northrhein-Westphalia) host bigger soccer events,
on average. However, bigger trade fairs with more than 200,000 visitors each are
hosted also outside of the four largest agglomerations in Germany (e.g., in Hannover,
Mannheim, Düsseldorf, Leipzig, or Nuremberg). The subsequent analysis will assess
the eﬀects of such events (within limited geographical and temporal boundaries) on
the supply and demand of sex for sale in Germany.
6Each team in a pair has to play one home and one away game.
7Games in the German soccer league are generally played on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays.
Since there are Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays with and without league games, weekday ﬁxed
eﬀects are identiﬁed separately from game eﬀects.
8Germany uses a 5-digit system to identify postal areas. The data are aggregated to areas
corresponding to the ﬁrst two digits of this postal zip code.
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Figure 5.1: Soccer stadiums and trade fair visitors
These two maps present the maximum capacity of soccer stadiums and annual number of trade
fair visitors on the 2 digit zip code level (zip code z). Areas with a higher value of the variable are
marked in darker color. Source: Own representation.
(a) Maximum capacity of soccer stadiums (b) Total number of trade fair visitors
5.4 Empirical analysis
5.4.1 Econometric approach
In the empirical model, we utilize information on generic outcomes yszd. We model
yszd as an exponential function of xszdβ, where xszd is a 1×K vector of determinants
with kth element xk,szd (including ﬁxed eﬀects) and β is an unknown parameter
vector. Notice that each contract s is uniquely related to a particular day d and
zip code z. Days d and zip codes z are repeatedly observed in the data. The
three main advantages of exponential-family models are that (i) the boundedness of
the dependent variable is respected, (ii) that the variance-covariance matrix of the
parameters may be corrected for heteroskedasticity of unknown form (Fisher, 1949;
Nelder & Wedderburn, 1972; Wedderburn, 1974), and (iii) that the parameters β
may be interpreted as elasticities and semi-elasticities (depending on whether xszd
is measured in logs or levels), unlike with most non-linear models. For that reason
we employ Poisson quasi-maximum-likelihood estimators as advocated by Cameron
& Trivedi (2005).
Deﬁning the conditional mean of yszd by yszd, the econometric models estimated
and their ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) read
Model: yszd = exp(xszdβ) + uszd, (5.1)
FOC:
S∑
s=1
(yszd − yszd)xszd = 0, (5.2)
where FOC is a 1 × K vector. The parameters βˆ can be found by following the
procedure in Wedderburn (1974) which essentially searches for βˆ in (5.1) by main-
65
taining (5.2). Usual standard errors are calculated using the observed information
matrix (OIM).
5.4.2 Results
The regression results are summarized in Tables 5.3-5.5. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain
ﬁve and Table 5.5 contains six numbered columns, which refer to diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions in terms of explanatory variables used (xk,szd). We ﬁrst look at the inﬂuences
of events on supply and demand on this platform,9 being able to distinguish between
the extensive and the intensive margin. The dependent variables are number of sell-
ers, number of oﬀered sexual services per seller, number of bidders, number of bids
per bidder and number of contracted sexual services, each per zip code z and day d.
While Table 5.3 presents result for the whole sample of auctions and buy-now oﬀers,
5.4 presents results for auction oﬀers only. Hence, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 use grouped
data such that the index szd is generally replaced by the index zd in equations (5.1)
and (5.2). We then consider the dependent variable hourly wages (Table 5.5).
Table 5.3: Regression results A: Supply and demand, Auctions and Buy-now oﬀers
Dependent variable Events per region and day (Eventszd) - Auctions and Buy-now
Nr. of Nr. of oﬀers Nr. of Nr. of bids Nr. of
sellers per seller bidders per bidder sold oﬀers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SoccerMatchzd 0.4880** 0.3244 0.8316*** 0.5481 0.6619***
(0.2232) (0.2892) (0.1225) (0.3503) (0.2065)
HomeGamezd 0.0541 0.0175 0.0357 0.0351 0.0409
(0.0683) (0.0812) (0.0409) (0.1041) (0.0670)
TradeFairzd 0.3486*** 0.4678*** 0.1166 0.4910*** 0.3384***
(0.1233) (0.1495) (0.0739) (0.1917) (0.1210)
ECMatchd 0.5956*** 0.6958*** 0.7005*** 0.7374*** 0.6187***
(0.0446) (0.0512) (0.0260) (0.0663) (0.0434)
ECMatchDEUd -0.1405* -0.1257 -0.2284*** -0.2123* -0.1352*
(0.0815) (0.0926) (0.0487) (0.1235) (0.0787)
LnNrSoccerV isitorszd -0.0223 -0.0030 -0.0596*** -0.0234 -0.0394**
(0.0214) (0.0278) (0.0116) (0.0335) (0.0198)
LnNrTradeFairV isitorszd -0.0037 -0.0179 0.0288*** -0.0211 -0.0033
(0.0151) (0.0185) (0.0090) (0.0237) (0.0149)
SoccerMatchneighborZipzd 0.6459*** 0.7133*** 0.6655*** 0.7423*** 0.6222***
(0.0471) (0.0525) (0.0279) (0.0684) (0.0467)
HomeGameneighborZipzd 0.0325 0.0084 0.0356 -0.0057 0.0455
(0.0548) (0.0613) (0.0325) (0.0798) (0.0544)
TradeFairneighborZipszd 0.7294*** 0.8086*** 0.7086*** 0.8146*** 0.7190***
(0.0234) (0.0266) (0.0142) (0.0352) (0.0231)
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zipcode FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of observations 45125 45125 45125 45125 45125
Nr. of events 19774 15236 55349 8930 20499
Notes: The table presents the regression results of the supply and demand regressions using the full
sample of auction and buy-now oﬀers. Indices z and d refer to 2-digit zip codes and days. Usual
(observed information matrix) standard errors are given in brackets and ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance
at the 1%/5%/10% level.
9The data do not permit an analysis of displacement eﬀects of oﬀered oﬀ-line services by online
ones. Moreover, they do also not permit an analysis of displacement eﬀects of services oﬀered at
other online platforms by the considered one. However, it seems unlikely that there would be a bias
exactly towards or away from the considered platform. Moreover, since we include zip code ﬁxed
eﬀects, the results should be interpreted as to reﬂect direct eﬀects within zip codes from events
and other fundamentals within that or neighboring zip codes.
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Table 5.4: Regression results B: Supply and demand, Auctions only
Dependent variable Events per region and day (Eventszd) - Auctions only
Nr. of Nr. of oﬀers Nr. of Nr. of bids Nr. of
sellers per seller bidders per bidder sold oﬀers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SoccerMatchzd 0.2034 0.1169 0.1310 0.6738 0.1801
(0.3462) (0.3850) (0.3042) (0.7638) (0.3447)
HomeGamezd 0.0648 0.0671 0.1157 0.1962 0.0433
(0.1014) (0.1074) (0.0892) (0.2702) (0.1012)
TradeFairzd 0.4658*** 0.5956*** 0.3705** 1.5383*** 0.4715***
(0.1785) (0.1893) (0.1571) (0.4563) (0.1767)
ECMatchd 0.4985*** 0.5412*** 0.4270*** 0.2597 0.4550***
(0.0657) (0.0696) (0.0604) (0.1768) (0.0658)
ECMatchDEUd -0.0839 -0.0140 0.0020 0.1422 -0.0754
(0.1185) (0.1222) (0.1065) (0.2987) (0.1187)
LnNrSoccerV isitorszd 0.0009 0.0123 0.0031 -0.0449 0.0037
(0.0334) (0.0371) (0.0293) (0.0725) (0.0332)
LnNrTradeFairV isitorszd -0.0193 -0.0281 -0.0049 -0.1597*** -0.0178
(0.0218) (0.0233) (0.0191) (0.0581) (0.0216)
SoccerMatchneighborZipzd 0.6410*** 0.6697*** 0.6293*** 0.8198*** 0.6141***
(0.0681) (0.0710) (0.0604) (0.1730) (0.0686)
HomeGameneighborZipzd 0.0386 0.0596 0.0687 -0.1989 0.0612
(0.0791) (0.0822) (0.0701) (0.2076) (0.0796)
TradeFairneighborZipszd 0.7396*** 0.7563*** 0.7561*** 0.7520*** 0.7411***
(0.0330) (0.0350) (0.0292) (0.0861) (0.0328)
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zipcode FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of observations 45125 45125 45125 45125 45125
Nr. of events 9614 8574 12088 1506 9689
Notes: The table presents the regression results of the supply and demand regressions using the sub-
sample of auction oﬀers only. Indices z and d refer to 2-digit zip codes and days. Usual (observed
information matrix) standard errors are given in brackets and ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
Supply and Demand estimations
Column (1) in Table 5.3 clearly indicates that if the home team of a zip-code area
has a match day (there is no diﬀerence between a home or an away game) and if a
convention is held there, the supply of sexual services both in the respective zip code
and in neighboring zip codes rises. The number of sellers in the respective zip code
per day rises on days with soccer-league games by 100(exp(0.4880) − 1) ' 62.9%,
and on convention days by 100(exp(0.3486)− 1) ' 41.7%. In neighboring zip codes
these numbers are 90.8% and 107.4%, respectively. Additionally, in all zip codes
the number of sellers rises by 81.4% on European-Championship-match days (13.1%
less when Germany played). While there are more sellers in the respective zip
code areas on days with soccer-league games, sellers do not oﬀer more services
(see Column 2). In contrast to that, not only the number of sellers, but also the
number of oﬀered services per seller rises in a zip code if conventions are taking place
there (59.6%), and it also rises in neighboring zip codes on days with soccer-league
games (104.1%) and trade-convention days (124.5%), as well as in all zip codes on
European-Championship-match days (100.5%).
On the demand side, when a local soccer team has a match day, the number of
men placing at least one bid is 129.7% higher in the respective zip code and 94.5%
higher in neighboring areas (see Column 3). The average trade fair has an eﬀect
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of 25% on demand at the zip code where the convention takes place (TradeFairzd
is not signiﬁcant, but LnNrTradeFairzd is) and 103.1% in neighboring zip codes.
European Championship matches raise the number of bidders by 101.5% in all zip
codes (German European Championship matches lessen this eﬀect by 20.4%). When
looking at the intensive margin (see Column 4), soccer-match days do not raise the
number of bids per bidder, but these rise due to trade fairs taking place in the zip
code itself (63.4%) and in neighboring zip codes (125.8%), as well as in neighboring
zip codes on soccer days (110.1%) and in all zip codes on European-Championship-
match days (109.1%).
Finally, the number of contracted services in this market is raised by all ﬁve
event variables (see Column 5). Interestingly, the direct eﬀect of a soccer match is
more than twice as high as that of a trade fair (93.8% vs. 40.3%), but the indirect
one is smaller (86.3% vs. 105.2%).
According to Table 5.4, when considering auctions rather than auctions together
with buy-it-now transactions, there is no direct eﬀect of soccer matches on the ﬁve
supply and demand variables. While direct eﬀects of trade fairs on all ﬁve variables
are slightly larger than in the whole sample, European-Championship-match eﬀects
are slightly smaller. Indirect eﬀects of soccer games and trade fairs on neighboring
zip codes are of the same size as in the whole sample.
Summing up and accounting for direct as well as indirect eﬀects, the aggregate
eﬀect of soccer-league games on the number of sellers and the number of paid sex
services oﬀered per seller through www.gesext.de is about 113.7% and 35.2%. The
combined eﬀect on the number of bidders, bids per bidder, and contracted services is
66.5%, 36.8%, and 69.2%, respectively. The eﬀect of soccer games plus conventions
in Germany on the numbers of services supplied and demanded amounts to about
277.0% (number of sellers), 175.2% (number oﬀers per seller), 155.4% (number of
bidders), 185.9% (number of bids per bidder), and 192.4% (number of contracted
services), respectively. Sex workers seem to anticipate the higher demand and oﬀer
more services on days of soccer events and trade fairs.
Price estimations Table 5.5 looks at the second dimension of eﬀects of events
on sexual services for pay: log hourly wages at which these services are contracted.
Columns (1) and (4) employ the zip code z-speciﬁc soccer-team and trade-fair vari-
ables. Columns (2) and (5) add the European Championship soccer variables and
Columns (3) and (6) add information on visitor numbers of soccer games and trade
fairs as well as indicators regarding events in neighboring zip codes. Columns (1) -
(3) are based on data where sexual service contracts are an outcome of a true auction
or a buy-it-now sale, while Columns (4) - (6) include auctions only. Columns (1)-(6)
in Table 5.5 suggest that both types of soccer-game events (local teams' matches and
European Championship matches) as well as trade fairs matter for the contracted
price of sexual services for pay. Events seem to have a relatively bigger eﬀect on
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the price determined by auctions than by buy-it-now. To see this, compare the
coeﬃcients in Columns (1) and (2) with those in Columns (4) and (5), respectively.
Moreover, as expected, adding European Championship events to local soccer team
events does not change the coeﬃcients on the latter. The reason is simply that the
European Championship happened out of the German league games season. Let us
ﬁrst focus on a discussion of the results in Columns (2) and (4).
Table 5.5: Regression results C: Price estimations
Dependent variable HourlyWageszd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SoccerMatchzd 0.0133*** 0.0129*** -0.2138*** 0.0669*** 0.0665*** -0.1736***
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0208) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0263)
HomeGamezd -0.0168*** -0.0167*** -0.0143*** -0.0487*** -0.0485*** -0.0466***
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
GameLostzd -0.0307*** -0.0308*** -0.0281*** -0.1047*** -0.1048*** -0.1013***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
TradeFairzd 0.0208*** 0.0210*** 0.1086*** 0.0174*** 0.0181*** 0.1510***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0104) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0154)
ECMatchd -0.0643*** -0.0658*** -0.0907*** -0.0921***
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0062)
ECMatchDEUd 0.0443*** 0.0432*** 0.1346*** 0.1339***
0.0078 (0.0078) (0.0108) (0.0108)
ECMatchDEULoosed -0.1108 -0.1045 -0.2241** -0.2163**
(0.0686) (0.0686) (0.1008) (0.1008)
LnNrSoccerV isitorszd 0.0229*** 0.0242***
(0.0020) (0.0026)
LnNrTradeFairV isitorszd -0.0110*** -0.0167***
(0.0012) (0.0019)
SoccerMatchNeighborZipzd 0.0014 0.0094**
(0.0033) (0.0048)
HomeGameNeighborZipzd -0.0386*** -0.0526***
(0.0039) (0.0057)
TradeFairNeighborZipzd 0.0148*** 0.0161***
(0.0018) (0.0027)
DWeightszd 0.0091*** 0.0095*** 0.0092*** 0.0075*** 0.0083*** 0.0077***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Overweightszd -0.2158*** -0.2161*** -0.2162*** -0.2262*** -0.2264*** -0.2268***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
DHeightszd -3.2891*** -3.1832*** -3.2336*** -5.0934*** -4.9864*** -5.0325***
(0.3069) (0.3071) (0.3073) (0.3973) (0.3977) (0.3978)
Heightszd 0.0336*** 0.0323*** 0.0329*** 0.0566*** 0.0553*** 0.0559***
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Height2szd -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DAgeszd 0.5171*** 0.5152*** 0.5157*** 0.7065*** 0.7060*** 0.7097***
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Ageszd -0.0201*** -0.0200*** -0.0200*** -0.0361*** -0.0361*** -0.0363***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Age2szd 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firstszd 0.1211*** 0.1207*** 0.1204*** 0.1716*** 0.1709*** 0.1712***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Singleszd -0.1303*** -0.1306*** -0.1302*** -0.0794*** -0.0800*** -0.0792***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. of observations 27967 27967 27967 14768 14768 14768
Observations included All All All Auctions Auctions Auctions
only only only
Notes: This table presents the results of the price estimations. The ﬁrst three columns use the whole data set, while columns
(4) to (6) use the sub-sample of auction oﬀers only. Indices s, z, and d refer to sold (or oﬀered) services, 2-digit zip codes, and
days, respectively. Usual (observed information matrix) standard errors are reported in brackets below the regression coeﬃcients
and ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Column (2) of Table 5.5 suggests that won away games raise the hourly wage
by 100(exp(0.0129) − 1) ' 1.3%, while won home games in the German soccer
league lower the average contracted price per sexual service oﬀer for pay by about
100(exp(0.0129− 0.0167)− 1) ' −0.4%. Moreover, lost away games in the German
soccer league reduce the average contracted price per sexual service oﬀer for pay by
100(exp(0.0129−0.0307)−1) ' −1.7% and lost home games even reduce it by about
100(exp(0.0129− 0.0167− 0.0307)− 1) ' −3.4%. The average price eﬀects are a lot
stronger for European Championship games, where the average eﬀect on games not
involving Germany was negative (' −6.2%), and the average eﬀect of German games
69
was less negative for won games (100(exp(−0.0643 + 0.0443) − 1) ' −2.0%) and
more negative for lost games (100(exp(−0.0643 + 0.0443− 0.1108)− 1) ' −12.3%).
The eﬀect of the average trade fair on prices is about 2.1%.
In general, the eﬀects on auction prices (where the price is not determined ex
ante by the service supplier) are much bigger. To see this, compare Column (5) with
Column (2) in Table 5.5. For instance, on days where the local soccer team won an
away league game, customers were willing to pay a price premium of about 6.9% per
auction relative to other days. On the other hand, on days where the local soccer
team lost a home game, paid sexual service suppliers had to take a pay cut of more
than 8%. Also the predatory eﬀect of European Championship games is much bigger
on auction prices than on buy-it-now prices, according to the comparison of Column
(5) with Column (2). With regard to auction prices, the local price premium on local
paid sex services associated with a won away game in the German soccer league was
more than three times bigger than that of a local trade fair (6.9% vs.1.9%)! Clearly
50% of the German league games in the data were played at home. On average
(i.e., across home and away games), about 38% of these games were lost by the local
team. Hence, the weighted average direct eﬀect of German league events on the
local hourly price (within the same zip code) sex workers could charge was about
−0.7%. That eﬀect was about 0.2% for auction prices.
Columns (3) and (6) include indicators for events (soccer games and trade shows)
taking place at a neighboring zip code (indirect eﬀects) as well as visitor numbers of
soccer games and trade fairs. Marginal eﬀects of an away game are not signiﬁcant,
while they are negative for a home game (−3.8%). In contrast, marginal eﬀects of
visitor numbers at trade fairs in a neighboring zip code are positive and signiﬁcant
(1.5%). For events taking place within a zip code, marginal eﬀects were larger for
smaller soccer events, but smaller for larger trade fairs. As we have seen, soccer
games and conventions display direct and indirect, local and neighborhood eﬀects
which may reinforce and mitigate each other. One may calculate aggregate eﬀects of
soccer games (and soccer games plus trade fairs) on hourly wages in Germany  i.e.,
accounting for direct as well as indirect eﬀects. Aggregate eﬀects of soccer events
and soccer events plus conventions, respectively, on hourly wages of auctions and
buy-it-nows are relatively small (−0.14% and 2.5% respectively). These eﬀects are
slightly larger if only auctions are considered (3.1% and 5.3%). In general, evidence
of larger eﬀects on auctions than on buy-it-now prices suggests that the demand
eﬀect is bigger than the supply eﬀect when considering prices.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the inﬂuence of soccer and trade fair events on the local
supply and demand of sexual services for pay in Germany. To provide evidence that
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events are relatively important, we use a transaction-level data-set on the oﬀers
and purchases of sexual services, extracted from a German online platform. Soccer
game (German league or European Championship) and trade fair events both raise
the number of sellers, bidders and contracted services on this platform in the high
double-digit percentage range. Eﬀects on prices are smaller, but signiﬁcant as well.
For soccer events, these eﬀects depend on whether events happen locally (home
games versus away games), and how the local team fairs (looses or wins). Overall,
the estimated eﬀects are rather large for the numbers of active sex workers (113% for
soccer games and 277% for local soccer events and conventions together) as well as
bidders (66% and 155%). These eﬀects are geographical in scope and display some
contagion across 2-digit zip code boundaries. Eﬀects on prices are more moderate
with e.g. 3− 5% for auctions.
While we only look at the tip of the iceberg (5.6 million Euros earned by 3, 206
suppliers), the total market for sexual services oﬀered in Germany is huge. In 2003
it has been estimated to include 400, 000 sex workers earning 14.5 billion euros
(or 0.4% of the German GDP) and is likely to be even larger today (Reichel &
Topper, 2003). From a broader perspective, insights into this matter are relevant
since (especially, unprotected) sexual work for pay is known to contribute to the
spreading of certain diseases (see Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005) and the
supply of sexual services is linked with criminal activities related to the control of
sexual workers and human traﬃcking (see Cho et al., 2012). Also in the data at hand,
about 8% of the services oﬀered are unprotected services. Hence, we might conclude
that a shadow consequence of big events is that they contribute to the generation
of adverse health eﬀects and the existence of criminal activity via their stimulating
eﬀect on the demand and supply of sex work. With a view on policy implications,
we might conclude that, due to a higher supply and demand in relatively narrow
spatial aggregates and speciﬁc time intervals around conventions and sports events,
the monitoring of sexual workers could be relatively eﬀectively administered and
improved.
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Chapter 6
The long shadow of the iron curtain
for female sex workers in German
cities: Border eﬀects and regional
diﬀerences
6.1 Introduction
In contrast to many other countries in Europe or in the United States, sex work is
legal in Germany, and, according to various sources it constitutes activity of nontriv-
ial economic magnitude (see Reichel & Topper, 2003; Kavemann & Steﬀan, 2013).
Interest in sex work is broad in the social sciences, and it has three major roots:
ﬁrst, fostering the understanding of the driving forces of the supply and demand of
sex work, since it is associated with social stigma, a lack of outside opportunities, a
complete lack of or reduced access to social security and pension systems, and with
economic restraints (see Cameron & Collins, 2003; Moﬀatt & Peters, 2004; Sanders,
2004; Arunachalam & Shah, 2008; Collins & Judge, 2008; Hubbard & Whowell,
2008; Döring, 2014); second, understanding how the aforementioned stigmatization
of sex workers and their activity, in many countries, at the boundaries of legality,
lead to a coexistence of sex work with criminal activity at large, ranging from drug
use and trading over human traﬃcking to tax fraud (see Albrecht et al., 1999; Kubrin
& Weitzer, 2003; Cho et al., 2012; Döring, 2014); third, the understanding of the
circumstances under which sex workers expose themselves and their customers to
risky services through  in particular, unprotected  sex work and an associated
transmission of diseases (see Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005; Cunningham &
Kendall, 2010b; de la Torre et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2011; Arunachalam & Shah,
2013).
Apart from individual characteristics of people selecting into sex work, the so-
cial sciences point to regionally or spatially bound social and economic conditions
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which stimulate or deter the supply and demand of sexual services for pay. For
instance, research in sociology points to a geographical dimension of morality be-
yond legality (see Hubbard, 2001; Hubbard & Sanders, 2003; Hubbard & Whowell,
2008; Cameron, 2004 ): local authorities or subgroups of citizens with relatively
homogeneous views determine the local level of acceptance of sex work. This view is
consistent with Green's theory of sexual ﬁelds (Green, 2008, 2011), the aggregation
of individual sexual desires in some space such as geography. To the extent that
social ﬁelds induce a gravitational pull, they induce a diversiﬁcation of regions and
places, lead to a selection of individuals in and to those places, and they shape the
habit and behavior of individuals living therein. Moreover, regions and places are
not only characterized by diﬀerences in preferences, norms, and social conditions,
they also diﬀer in terms of the enforceability of norms on non-compliers as empha-
sized by the theory of social disorganization (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Hence, there
is a geographical dimension to the emergence and acceptance of sex work, which has
to do with diﬀerences in preferences across places but also with the enforceability
of norms.
One regional aspect of attitudes towards and prevalence of sex work in Germany
clearly has to do with the location of the former Iron Curtain along the boundaries
of what was called the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG). The former border between the two historical Germanies
marks a multidimensional space of discontinuities in preferences and norms which
still persist more than 20 years after the reuniﬁcation (for instance, see Alesina &
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007, for general diﬀerences in preferences between Germans in
the former East and West). Bauernschuster & Rainer (2010) show that Germans in
the so-called New Länder (the former East) hold more egalitarian sex role attitudes,
and there is no sign of this diﬀerence to vanish yet. Heineck & Süssmuth (2010),
Becker & Hainz (2011), Vosskort & Necker (2014) as well as Dohmen et al. (2011)
show that diﬀerences in preferences and attitudes may generally be persistent for
generations. In the context of sex work the demarcation of regions and places along
the boundaries of the former Iron Curtain is interesting, since the two historical Ger-
manies diﬀered substantially by legal treatment of sex work as well as the tolerance
and social status of sex workers, as will become clear in the next section.
The present chapter uses online auction data of 3, 204 sex workers in Germany
across more than 27, 946 transactions over the period of January 16 2011 to Septem-
ber 9, 2012. The results suggest that, indeed, there is an important regional com-
ponent in the price sex workers can achieve and in the probability of their engaging
in risky behavior through oﬀering unprotected (unsafe) sexual services. We ﬁnd
evidence of a speciﬁc component accruing to larger cities in general and to Berlin
in particular. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, conditional on other determinants, prices
are higher where sex work was illegal during the separation of the two Germanies,
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namely in the New Länder (the East). This gap in prices is larger in larger ag-
glomerations along the former Iron Curtain. Moreover, we ﬁnd a strong network or
peer-group component in both the pricing as well as the unprotected sex services.
The latter supports theories claiming a formative eﬀect of regions due to the preva-
lence of certain norms and the ability to enforce them, e.g. through existing social
ﬁelds.
The remainder of the chapter provides an outline of sex work in post-World-War-
II Germany in Section 6.2. It introduces and describes data on sex work activity
collected from a large online platform which features ebay-type (second-price auc-
tion) mechanisms for sex work in Section 6.3. The chapter presents a set of methods
in pursuit of speciﬁc research questions and a summary of the associated ﬁndings in
Section 6.4, and it oﬀers a short set of conclusions in the last section.
6.2 Sex work and sex workers in Germany
6.2.1 Sex work in the GDR versus the FRG
In the early days of the Soviet empire, prostitution was deemed inconsistent with the
role of women in society, and prostitutes were "encouraged" to engage in "regular"
work. Prostitution was free and tolerated in most Western European countries (and
still is to date in many), including Germany, at the time. However, the formation of
the Soviet bloc and the occupation of six of Germany's federal states with the result
of the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West and the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East led to unconstrained activity of
prostitutes in the former and to constrained activity of prostitutes in the latter. At
ﬁrst, prostitutes in the GDR were only allowed to pursue their activity part-time,
and ultimately prostitution was declared illegal with a threat of prosecution from
1968 onward.1
In spite of its illegality, prostitution existed and was tolerated in urban areas
such as Leipzig or Rostock, primarily in hotels that accepted foreign currency (and
where tourists and members of the GDR's political and military establishment were
hosted). With their access to foreign and domestic sensitive information, prostitutes
became strategic elements in the information gathering by the political establishment
(see Falck, 1998). Hence, in spite of their oﬃcial illegality, prostitutes  with their
access to foreign currency and their tolerance and even use by GDR's political and
executive establishment  were part of the elite and could maintain a relatively
high standard of living, not only relative to average citizens in the GDR but also
compared to prostitutes in the FRG relative to average citizens there: prostitution
was largely seen as a service for survival in the FRG but as a service for luxury in
1Until 1967, the FRG and GDR employed the same framework to penal law codex.
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the GDR (see Falck (1998, p. 107)).2 With the removal of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and the re-uniﬁcation of the two Germanies in 1990, a process of drastic societal
and economic change started which progressed impressively since but is not ﬁnished
yet.
6.2.2 Other regional aspects of sex work in Germany
Although Germany has a nationally identical legal framework for sex work, regions
diﬀer due to the varying implementation of this law, community laws, and a hetero-
geneity of the regional population.
In 2002, Germany introduced a new legal framework to strengthen the rights of
sex workers on the national level. In general, sex workers can now legally sell sexual
services and are able to settle legal disputes on service fees, rental, etc., in front of a
court. At the same time, procuration or human traﬃcking are still illegal. In theory,
with one of the most liberal laws in Europe, sex work in Germany is now accepted
as a normal job with all the rights (health insurance, social beneﬁts) and duties
(taxes) workers in other sectors have. Nevertheless, due to the federal structure of
Germany, the regions have to enforce the new law and communities are able to set
their own `ban zones' (while Munich has had such a ban zone for quite some time and
sex work takes place in the outskirts of the city, the red-light district at Frankfurt on
Main is very close to the main station) and taxes (the city of Cologne introduced an
enjoyment tax with a yearly revenue of about 700.000 Euros, Stuttgart's revenues
are estimated to be about 1 million Euros per annum, VG Cologne, 2007; Preiss,
2012). This has only an indirect eﬀect on online sex workers, but a very direct one
on the oine part of the market.
In general, regions in Germany diﬀer in many aspects that have been shown to
be correlated with the supply or demand of sexual services such as population struc-
ture, religion, income, job opportunities, inmoving men, ethnic networks (which are
necessary to provide infrastructure for legal foreign sex workers or illegal procuration
and human traﬃcking). E.g., Cameron & Collins (2003) argue that male participa-
tion in the market for sexual services is amongst others correlated with religion (due
to the relative lack of free sex opportunities made available by religious women)
and men that have recently moved to a new area (thereby missing well developed
personal networks). Supply and demand both depend on local preferences and in-
ﬂuence each other. Diﬀerentiated sexual desires on the demand side aggregate to
a market whose demand will be fulﬁlled by sex workers and, vice versa, existing
diﬀerenciated service oﬀerings attract new customers. New sellers entering the mar-
ket have to recognize the local market structure and rules and adapt their service
oﬀerings to local habits (Döring, 2014).
2Lucas (2005) records that, while the primary motive for prostitution is economic, other motives
are ﬂexibility and freedom, enjoyment of variety, available options, and job satisfaction.
75
To sum up, in an analysis of the determinants of the supply and demand of sexual
services, paying attention to regional facets and characteristics appears important.
6.3 Data
This chapter utilizes the universe of data of the internet platform www.gesext.de,
a digital market place (or matching site) where mainly women oﬀer sexual services
for pay3. For provision of their services, the platform owners charge a fee of 15
percent. The activity is legal and, in the case of platform owners, does not even count
as procuration. Identities of suppliers and customers are known to the platform
administrators such that contract enforcement is not an issue, similar to ebay, and
identities can be revealed to legal (judicial and executive) authorities in case of
problems (e.g., pregnancy and associated claimed alimony payments, infections with
diseases associated with sexual service provision, etc.). Between January 16 in 2011
and September 9 in 2012, the platform administered 27, 946 transactions oﬀered by
females  of which 11, 114 were oﬀered only as a second-price auctions in a narrow
sense, 10, 602 as buy-it-now at a ﬁxed price oﬀer, and 6, 230 both as an auction in
a narrow sense and as buy-it-now, akin to ebay. The nominal revenue total (net
services costs gross of taxes plus administration fees) adds up to 5.59 million Euros
within the considered time span.4
Apart from specifying a starting price for auctions, a ﬁxed price for buy-it-
now sales together with the duration and nature of the service, and some of their
physical characteristics, women determine the location of the service by way of
a two-digit German zip code which is known to the customer.5 Moreover, it is
known when the service oﬀer was posted, and whether and when it was contracted.
Anonymized digital identities of both suppliers and buyers and, hence, the repeated
activity (sequentially or within-time) of one and the same individual under the same
nickname is known. Altogether, there are 95 unique two-digit zip codes (Berlin and
Munich are composed of four and two such zip codes, respectively), 76 of which are
located in Germany's 10 Old Länder which formed the FGR prior to 1990 (West
Germany) and 19 are located in the country's 6 New Länder which formed the GDR
(East Germany) prior to 1990. Of the 27, 946 transactions analysed here, 24, 542
(or 88%) and 3, 404 (or 12%) belonged in the Old and New Länder, respectively.
Table 6.1 summarizes information about the ﬁrst and second moments of the
main variables and some control variables, for the pooled sample as well as for the
3E.g., Hubbard & Whowell, 2008 emphasize that considering male sex workers is important for
gaining broader insights into the industry. Unfortunately, the data available to us do not permit
such an analysis, since male oﬀers on the platform are scarce and (the sometimes negative) prices
reveal peculiarities of that market segment in the data at hand.
4For the U.S. market, Cunningham & Kendall (2011b) report a signiﬁcant shift from oine to
online prostitution over recent years, especially, for the upper price end of the market. Hence, the
lower end of the market (e.g., street prostitution) is not represented in this data set.
5Clearly, the location of the service oﬀer may diﬀer from the (unknown) residence of the provider.
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East and the West, separately.6 Looking at West (East) Germany, the average hourly
wage is 102.30 (102.82) Euro, 6.50% (14.01%) of the oﬀers include unprotected sex,
the average population size in the same zip code area is 945, 009 (543, 165), the
average population density per square kilometer in the same zip code area is 1022
(419) and average GDP per capita in the same zip code is 34, 853 (23, 537) Euro.
17.51% (6.61%) of the contracts are made in one of the ten largest regions, the
average number of cars in the same 2-digit zip code area is 535.15 (498.21) and
the average number of Michelin star restaurants in the same 2-digit zip code area
is 3.55 (1.61). The average duration of an oﬀered service is 3.09 (3.23) hours. In
35.9% (31.37%) of the auctions the seller posts her weight. Of these 17.13% (14.14%)
report to be overweight. In 59.7% (58.7%) of the auctions the seller posts her height,
which is on average 166.64 cm (167.43 cm). 69.4% (71.0%) provide their age and
the average age is then 29.7 (29.9) years. 4.75% (2.73%) of the sellers claim to be
oﬀering for the ﬁrst time, 8.5% (8.0%) to be single. Hence, except for the propensity
of unprotected sexual service oﬀerings, the nature of auctions oﬀered (including the
sellers' attributes) seem to be rather similar in formerly West and East Germany.
The data at hand contain information about the time of the posting of the
service oﬀer (an auction or a buy-it-now) as well as the concluded contract. Each
oﬀer or contract represents a cross-sectional unit so that we may suppress the time
index (we still can employ time-speciﬁc determinants as contract-speciﬁc attributes)
without loss of generality. We use an index i = 1, . . . , N = 27, 946 to denote such
cross-sectional units (transactions).
6.4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we address various aspects of sex worker behavior along the lines
of the pricing of and the acceptance of risk in terms of unprotected sexual services
oﬀerings. In particular, we are interested in four dimensions of the question: (i) how
large the part of the variance is in the measures of behavior considered that can be
explained by time, region (2-digit zip codes) and individual (sex worker) attributes,
as well as the residual; (ii) to which extent the regional component can be explained
by observable regional variables; (iii) to which extent there is a discontinuity at the
former East-West-German border and by how much it varies with observables; and
(iv) to which extent there are regional network (peer group) eﬀects that aﬀect the
habit formation or the scope of initially supplied services. For these dimensions, we
allude to the methods employed for analysis ﬁrst and then present the associated
results.
6For studies on the determinants of hourly wages of sex workers see, e.g., Cunningham & Kendall
(2011b) or Moﬀatt & Peters (2004).
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6.4.1 Variability of sex work characteristics in Germany: Ge-
ography, Time, and Individuals
Empirical approach
The variability of multi-dimensional or multi-indexed data can suitably be analysed
in a basic way by means of an analysis of variance (ANOVA), a method which is
designed to linearly decompose the overall variance in data into its components (for
a detailed discussion see Scheﬀé, 1999).
For the question at stake, we may think of an outcome characterizing demand
and supply of a sexual service by yi, where i = 1, . . . , N refers to an individual
transaction which is unique per time, region, and individual sex worker. However,
transactions i are nested within time t = 1, . . . , T , regions r = 1, . . . , R, and sex
workers s = 1, . . . , S. Hence, we may write outcome yi also as ysrti and decompose
its variance by the model
ysrti = αt + βr + γs + εi (6.1)
where αt is a time (month) ﬁxed eﬀect of which there are T = 21 in the data, βr
is a region (2-digit zip code) ﬁxed eﬀect of which there are R = 95 in the data, γs is
an individual sex-worker eﬀect of which there are S = 3, 204 in the data, and εi is
a remainder (residual) term which captures all eﬀects that cannot be attributed to
time, regions, or sex workers but are speciﬁc to transactions or contracts of which
there are N = 27, 946 in the data.
The model in 6.1 may now be used to decompose the variance (i.e., the demeaned
average sum of squares) of ysrti into the components that can be attributed to time,
regions, sex workers, and the residual. Such an analysis is informative about the
relative importance of these components in the data.
Analysis of variance of log hourly wages charged for sexual work and the
probability of oﬀering unprotected sexual services
In this subsection, we undertake an analysis of variance on two alternative outcome
variables, ysrti: log hourly wages for sex work as contracted in the data, and a binary
indicator variable which is unity if a sex worker oﬀers unprotected sex services and
zero else. The results of the decomposition of the variance in these two variables
for all 27, 946 transactions in the data based on an ANOVA as in equation 6.1 are
summarized in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 is organized in two bigger horizontal blocks for the two outcomes
which contain four columns each (these are for the sum of squared deviations from
the mean, the number of degrees of freedom, the F-statistic of the joint signiﬁcance
of the respective ﬁxed eﬀects in the dimensions t, r, and s and the p-values of the
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Table 6.2: ANOVA results
Log hourly wage Unprotected sex
Partial SS df F p-value Partial SS df F p-value
Model 6,307.01 3,315 1.90 0.00 1,527.34 3,315 29.02 0.00
Month 7.33 20 0.37 0.00 0.94 20 2.95 0.00
Region 43.99 94 0.47 0.00 4.06 94 2.72 0.00
Sex worker 5,554.19 3,201 1.74 0.00 1,335.56 3,201 26.28 0.00
Residual 3,408.60 24,630 0.14 391.04 24,630
Total 9,715.62 27,945 0.35 1,918.38 27,945
Notes: The table presents the results of the ANOVA variance decomposition of the two
variables log hourly wages and unprotected sex. The sample contains 27,946 contracts, sold
within 21 months, in 95 regions and by 3,204 sex workers.
latter) and in three bigger horizontal blocks for the total sum of squared deviations
from the mean, the residual, and the model accruing to αt +βr + γs in equation 6.1.
The results may be summarized as follows. First, the residual makes up about
one-third of the variation in the data on log hourly wages and about one-ﬁfth of the
variation in the probability of unprotected sex oﬀerings. In either dimension, the
variance within the three dimensions of the model (time, region, and sex worker)
is dominated by sex worker-speciﬁc eﬀects within time and regions. However, the
regional dimension is much more important than time for either outcome. It is
also interesting to see that the relative importance of the regional dimension for the
oﬀering of unprotected sexual services is more important in relative terms than for
log hourly wages (to see this, compare 4.06/1, 918.38 = 0, 2% with 43.99/9, 715.62 =
0, 4%).
In what follows, we will shed further light on the role of regional characteristics
with an emphasis on urban agglomerations on the factors behind regional factors as
a determinant of hourly wages and unprotected service oﬀerings by sex workers.
6.4.2 Explaining the geographical component of sex work
characteristics: Evidence of social disorganization of
places
Empirical approach
In this subsection, we are interested in observable measures behind the region ﬁxed
eﬀects, βr. Such an assessment may be based either on a regression of parameter
estimates of these ﬁxed eﬀects, say, βˆr, or of averaged outcome per region, say, yr. An
advantage of such an analysis is that we may gain insights into speciﬁc characteristics
of places (zip codes) as drivers of certain aspects of sexual work outcome. Denoting
observable zip-code characteristics by xr (including a constant), what we have in
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mind is estimating a model of the type
yr = δxr + εr (6.2)
where δ is a conformable parameter vector and εr are all residual (not observed
or observable), region- or place-speciﬁc factors. Hence we ﬁrst calculate the averaged
outcome yr of log hourly wages and the probability of oﬀering unprotected services.
Then a between estimation is used to regress these two new variables against several
explanatory variables.
The role of observable place-speciﬁc factors for sexual worker outcome
Table 6.3 summarizes the results for two regressions, one for the place-speciﬁc com-
ponent of log hourly wages and one for that of unprotected sex services.
Table 6.3: Regression results: Geographical component of sex work characteristics
Dependant variable Log Oﬀering
hourly service
wages unprotected
Indicator for the ten largest 2-digit zipcodes -0.1634* 0.0131
(0.0896) (0.0291)
Log number of cars in same 2-digit zipcode 0.1263 0.0328
(0.0874) (0.0284)
Log number of Michelin star restaurants in same 2-digit zipcode 0.0306 -0.0030
(0.0359) (0.0117)
Log population in same 2-digit zipcode -0.1372* -0.0038
(0.0735) (0.0239)
Log population in same 2-digit zipcode squared 0.0940 0.0007
(0.0569) (0.0185)
Log population density in same 2-digit zipcode 0.1947 -0.1044
(0.3006) (0.0978)
Log population density in same 2-digit zipcode squared -0.0139 0.0079
(0.0247) (0.0080)
Log GDP per capita in same 2-digit zipcode -3.9631 0.7102
(5.2985) (1.7234)
Log GDP per capita in same 2-digit zipcode squared 0.1984 -0.0325
(0.2547) (0.0828)
Number of observations 95 95
R2 0.2074 0.0377
Notes: The table presents regression results of the geographical components of the two
variables log hourly wages and oﬀering services unprotected. Usual (observed information
matrix) standard errors are given in brackets below the coeﬃcients and ***/**/* denote
signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
In every one of the regressions we use the following observables: log popula-
tion and log population squared; log population density and log population density
squared; log per-capita income (GDP) and log per-capita income squared; the log
number of passenger cars; the log (one-plus) the number of Michelin-star restau-
rants; a binary indicator variable which is unity for the 10 largest 2-digit zip code
regions of Germany, and a constant. We ran further speciﬁcations which also in-
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cluded information on the number of hospital beds, ﬁve-star hotels, the number
of hotel visits and nights booked, the number of immigrants, of males commuting
in, the Theil index about income inequality in the region, the share of people with
more than 125,000 Euros of annual income, the average price per square meter of
land sold, the number of internet domains, the share of inhabitants with completed
secondary school education, the share of inhabitants in day care and kindergarten,
the share of street surface or of recreational surface in a place's total surface, and an
indicator for formerly East-German regions. At the level of 95 regions only, these
characteristics together did not contribute a signiﬁcant share of explanatory power
to the factors included in the speciﬁcations in Table 3.
In any case, the explanatory power of the speciﬁcation is much higher for the
continuous log hourly wage per service (with an R2 of 0.207) than for the binary
unprotected services (with an R2 of 0.038). With the latter outcome, none of the
included regressors is signiﬁcant even at a signiﬁcance level of 15%. With log hourly
wages, being in one of the ten largest cities contributes the lion's share in explanatory
power, and population size (through linear and squared terms) also contribute a
decent share (the squared term having a level of statistical signiﬁcance of 10.2%).
Hence, big cities stand out  with lower prices of contracted services per hour 
and other amenities are apparently too collinear with the large-city indicator and
do not have a discernible impact.
6.4.3 Discontinuities in sex work characteristics at the former
East-West-German border
Empirical approach
To estimate the impact (long shadow) of the former Iron Curtain on behavior of
sexual service providers, we may utilize a regression discontinuity design (RDD).
Such a design is helpful for avoiding an endogeneity bias in pricing, since the location
of the former border between East and West Germany can not be inﬂuenced by sex
workers nowadays (see Imbens & Lemieux, 2008, and Lee & Lemieux, 2010, for a
general discussion of RDDs and Egger & Lassmann, 2014, for a discussion of spatial
RDDs). The general idea of a spatial RDD is to compare two spatial observations'
outcome which are virtually identical and just located on diﬀerent sides of the same
border (e.g., being part of former East Germany or not). Clearly, the Old and the
New Länder diﬀer in many regards such that an unconditional mean comparison
of variables in the two aggregates may be misleading due to omitted confounding
factors, and even conditioning on observable characteristics may not allow for a
complete eradication of that problem. Since the border between the Old and the
New Länder entails a sharp boundary, we can use an RDD and take the limit of the
distance to the internal border in order to avoid diﬀerences between the West and the
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East beyond the historical political, societal, and economic separation (e.g., related
to the relative importance of urban relative to rural areas, the performance of local
labor markets, the availability of infrastructure, etc.) to the largest possible extent.
This RDD identiﬁes LATEeast , the local average treatment eﬀect of auctions in the
East (relative to the West) at the internal East-West border, the historical location
of the Iron Curtain, as outlined in Apppendix A.3.1.
Estimating the long shadow of the Iron Curtain in general and in Berlin
The RDD results are summarized in Table 6.4. The table is organized horizontally
in two big blocs: one for log hourly wages and one for binary unprotected services
oﬀerings. Within each bloc, one column on the left summarizes the ﬁndings for a par-
simonious model, assuming homogeneity of LATEeast, and one column summarizes
the ﬁndings when permitting LATEeast to be diﬀerent for Berlin and to generally
vary with log population. Each RDD regression includes several control variables
which pertain to the nature of the service (see Table 6.1) as well as a quadratic
control function based on log distance to the former Iron Curtain which is estimated
separately for West and East. In fact, we have estimated polynomial control func-
tions for ﬁrst-order, second-order, etc., up to ﬁfth-order polynomials. However, the
second-order (quadratic) polynomial function is selected by the Akaike Information
Criterion as the preferred speciﬁcation. All reported standard errors are clustered
at three levels: the 2-digit zip codes, East versus West, and the month of the oﬀer.
Looking ﬁrst at the zip-code and seller control variables results are not surprising.
Contracted hourly wages rise with a higher population density and also with a higher
GDP per capita and higher historical hourly prices in the respective zip code. Sellers
seem to achieve lower hourly wages the more hours the "date" will last and if they
claim to be single. Higher prices can be reached if they are not overweight, provide
their age, are young and claim to oﬀer a service for the ﬁrst time. The parameter on
the indicator variable of interest  easti  is 0.2724, respectively, signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Hence, conditional on the factors mentioned above, the result suggests that
prostitutes in Germany's East, the New Länder are still able to charge signiﬁcantly
higher (27%) relative service premia than their counterparts in the Western, Old
Länder. Figure 6.1a nicely illustrates this strong discontinuity of the log hourly
wages at the former Iron Curtain. Observations are categorized by the log-distance
towards the border (with negative values in the West) and each distance category is
represented by a dot. The size of the dot corresponds to the amount of observations
in the respective category and log hourly wages are depicted on the ordinate. The
polynomial function jumps at the former border and the same is true if the control
variables are included by looking at the residuals instead of hourly wages (Figure
6.1b).
The second column of Table 6.4 suggests that the LATEeast is indeed smaller
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Table 6.4: Regression results: East vs. West
Dependent variables Log Unprotected
hourly wages service oﬀering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indicator for East Germany 0.2724*** 0.3068*** 0.1379*** 0.0209
(0.0327) (0.0290) (0.0169) (0.0239)
Log Distance to inner german border × East G. -0.3403*** -0.4534*** -0.0866*** 0.1144***
(0.0588) (0.0323) (0.0280) (0.0358)
Log Distance to inner german border2× East G. 0.1227*** 0.1820*** 0.0008 -0.0508**
(0.0217) (0.0141) (0.0128) (0.0215)
Log Distance to inner german border 0.0120 0.0179 0.0236*** 0.0054
(0.0132) (0.0174) (0.0036) (0.0097)
Log Distance to inner german border2 0.0036 0.0061* 0.0082*** 0.0041*
(0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0025)
Log population size -0.0597*** 0.0215***
(0.0101) (0.0044)
Log population size × East Germany 0.0706*** -0.0528***
(0.0129) (0.0081)
Indicator for Berlin 0.1719*** 0.2038***
(0.0395) (0.0253)
Indicator for Berlin × East Germany -0.2163*** -0.2255***
(0.0585) (0.0390)
Log population density in same 2-digit zipcode 0.1220* 0.1036 0.0518* 0.0573**
(0.0696) (0.0806) (0.0276) (0.0257)
Log population density in same 2-digit zipcode2 -0.0097* -0.0079 -0.0051** -0.0056***
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0021) (0.0015)
Log GDP per capita in same 2-digit zipcode 0.1272*** 0.4107*** 0.0533*** 0.0078
(0.0248) (0.0103) (0.0084) (0.0187)
Duration of the service oﬀered -0.0551*** -0.0552*** 0.0029** 0.0033***
(0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0015) (0.0006)
Duration of the service oﬀered2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weight is provided 0.0093 0.0102 -0.0137 -0.0263*
(0.0078) (0.0103) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Overweight -0.2363*** -0.2372*** -0.0070 -0.0348***
(0.0153) (0.0158) (0.0069) (0.0043)
Height is provided -0.9921*** -1.0378*** -0.0632 0.0232
(0.2472) (0.2408) (0.3541) (0.2695)
Height in cm if height is provided 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age is provided 0.4054*** 0.4107*** 0.0020 0.0023
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0250) (0.0357)
Age in years if age is provided -0.0123*** -0.0124*** 0.0007*** 0.0009***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0004)
First-time supplier 0.1659*** 0.1647*** -0.0086 -0.0084
(0.0231) (0.0240) (0.0091) (0.0176)
Single -0.1012*** -0.1047*** 0.0099 0.0185
(0.0325) (0.0301) (0.0127) (0.0150)
History of hourwage in same 2-digit zipcode 0.3942*** 0.4045*** 0.0240 0.1011***
(0.0482) (0.0417) (0.0189) (0.0255)
AIC 1.014 1.009 0.169 0.615
BIC -23891.1 -23883.4 -124704.2 -25212.5
Number of observations 27811 27811 27811 27811
Notes: The table presents the results of the RDD at the former inner German border. The ﬁrst two columns
look at log hourly wages, columns (3) and (4) look at the probability of oﬀering unprotected services. Standard
errors are clustered at three levels: 2-digit zip codes, East versus West, as well as month of the oﬀer and are
given in brackets below the coeﬃcients. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Figure 6.1: Discontinuity at the former Iron Curtain
The graph illustrates the discontinuity of (residual) log hourly wages at the former German border.
The ordinate reﬂects the average (residual) log hourly wages in the respective distance-to-border
category. The size of the dots corresponds to the number of observations in the respective distance
category. Source: Own representation.
(a) Log hourly wages
(b) Residual log hourly wages
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in absolute value for Berlin  we interpret this as evidence of, e.g., greater com-
petition in the capital as well as of a greater exposure of Berlin to western stan-
dards historically  and that it is otherwise bigger with population. For an in-
terpretation of the LATEeast we have to recognize that the value of log popula-
tion in east Berlin takes on a value of 12.026. Hence, the overall LATEeast for
east Berlin is 0.307 + 0.071 · 12.026 − 0.216 ≈ 0.945. In other words, the log
hourly wage markup for sexual services in Berlin is about 100exp(0.945) − 100 ≈
157%. Had this been just another city of the same size, it would be estimated at
100exp(0.307 + 0.071 · 12.026)− 100 ≈ 219%.
The results for the (linear) probability of unprotected sexual service oﬀerings
suggest that the eﬀect on prices is not accompanied with one of diﬀerences in risky
supply behavior: neither the assumed-homogeneous nor the heterogeneous LATEeast
are signiﬁcant at customary levels for unprotected sexual services supply (Table 6.4,
columns 3 and 4).
6.4.4 Habit formation in versus location of speciﬁc sexual
work types in space
Empirical approach
In this sub-section, our interest is focused on regionally bound so-called contagion,
network, or peer-group eﬀects which lead to an impact of other sex workers' hourly
wage outcomes or unprotected sex services oﬀerings on a given sex worker's outcome
in the same region. In particular, we are interested in how such contagious eﬀects
diﬀer between ones on ﬁrst-time users of the platform versus continuers or stayers
on the platform. The latter suggests an adjustment of the habit of existing suppliers
while the former is indicative of a combined eﬀect on location and the initial scope
of services supplied.
For the empirical analysis, such an approach asks for regression models of the
form
ysrti = ysr(t−1)iλfirst + xsrtiδfirst + εi if firstsrti = 1,
ysrti = ysr(t−1)iλcontinued + xsrtiδcontinued + εi, if firstsrti = 0. (6.3)
where ysr(t−1)i is a weighted average of outcomes of all sex workers recorded in
the same region as sex worker s and transaction i but at time t-1. In the discussion
of the results, we will primarily focus on estimates of λfirst versus λcontinued.
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Estimates of peer-group eﬀects on habit formation and ﬁrst services post-
ings
The results of the analysis outlined in equation 6.3 are summarized in Table 6.5 for
the two outcomes of interest: log hourly wage and the probability of unptotected sex
oﬀering. The table is organized horizontally in four columns, two for each outcome.
The ﬁrst column for any outcome focuses on outcome of ﬁrst-time suppliers on the
platform while the second column focuses on continuing suppliers' outcome. Each
regression includes time (month) and region (2-digit zip-code) ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 6.5: Regression results: Habit formation
Dependent variables Log hourly Service oﬀered
wages unprotected
First time Continuing First time Continuing
(1A) (2A) (1B) (2B)
History of hourwage in same 2-digit zipcode 0.2710** 0.3551***
(0.1214) (0.0472)
History of oﬀering unprotected sex in same 2-digit z. 1.3500*** 0.7410***
(0.4164) (0.1313)
Duration of the service oﬀered -0.0911*** -0.0561*** 0.0024 0.0027***
(0.0068) (0.0049) (0.0038) (0.0007)
Duration of the service oﬀered squared 0.0005*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weight is provided 0.0348 0.0156 0.0497 -0.0313
(0.0279) (0.0355) (0.0353) (0.0197)
Overweight -0.3349*** -0.2448*** 0.0030 -0.0247**
(0.0603) (0.0399) (0.0254) (0.0112)
Height is provided -1.2316* -0.9167** 0.7924** 0.0403
(0.6620) (0.4392) (0.3824) (0.2367)
Height in cm if height is provided 0.0074* 0.0054** -0.0051** -0.0004
(0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0014)
Age is provided 0.4818*** 0.4295*** 0.1265** -0.0064
(0.1023) (0.0621) (0.0641) (0.0448)
Age in years if age is provided -0.0192*** -0.0132*** -0.0024 0.0012
(0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0014)
Single 0.0374 -0.1065* 0.0638 0.0177
(0.0532) (0.0564) (0.0476) (0.0290)
Region Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1250 26561 1250 26561
R2 0.6001 0.4060 0.2680 0.1288
Notes: The table presents the results of the habit formation regression and compares ﬁrst time users to non-ﬁrst
time users. The ﬁrst two columns look at log hourly wages and columns (3) and (4) look at the probability of
oﬀering unprotected services. Usual (observed information matrix) standard errors are given in brackets below
the coeﬃcients and ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
The results in the table suggest the following conclusions. First, irrespective
of the outcome (log hourly wage versus unprotected service supply) and the type
of provider considered (ﬁrst-time versus continuing supplier) considered, contagion
matters and sex workers are aﬀected by other sex workers' prior outcomes in the
same place (2-digit zip code area). However, while spillovers or peer-group eﬀects
are stronger for the habit formation of continuers rather than the pricing of ﬁrst
suppliers regarding the log hourly wage, the opposite is true for the oﬀering of
unprotected services. Sex worker-speciﬁc control variables aﬀect, in particular, the
hourly wage in an expected way: overweight and older sex workers have to accept a
lower price, and sex workers oﬀer longer durations of services at lower prices.
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6.5 Conclusions
It is well documented that people's preferences and attitudes display a spatial pat-
tern and are inﬂuenced by the local political regime and institutions. Political and
institutional perturbations lead to only a sluggish adjustment of those preferences
and attitudes. After the reuniﬁcation, sluggish adjustment of preferences and atti-
tudes is documented among the people in the former East and West.
At the time when East and West Germany were politically separated after World
War II, the classiﬁcation of, the access to, and the attitudes towards normal versus
luxury goods diverged since the War in the two Germanies. Falck (1998) documented
for the former East Germany that prostitution  while only tolerated and actually
illegal for most of the time  was an activity which generated relatively much higher
income and provided access to much more luxury in the East than in the West
of Germany. This chapter documents that sexual services for pay nowadays still
generate higher relative income to providers in what was East Germany than in
what was West Germany. Moreover, we demonstrate that pattern is even more
pronounced for larger cities such as Berlin. Finally, it is partly driven by network,
peer-group, and other spillover eﬀects which leads to a clustering in both the nature
(oﬀering unprotected sex) as well as the pricing of services by sex workers.
One conclusion which might be distilled for policy makers from this evidence is
that the application of risky practices of sex work, due to their clustered emergence,
might be addressed and prevented at relatively low cost when considering their
spatial pattern.
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Chapter A
Appendices
A.1 Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Convergence decomposition - Deduction
Price indices are in natural logs. There are m+n countries in two subgroups of size
m and n, and prices of a speciﬁc product group are normalized such that p¯m+n = 0.
For better readability we ﬁrst omit the product group index k.
p1, ..., pm︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, pm+1, ..., pm+n︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
p¯m+n =
1
m+ n
m+n∑
i=1
pi = 0 ; p¯m =
1
m
m∑
i=1
pi ; p¯n =
1
n
m+n∑
i=m+1
pi
We use the standard textbook equation of the variance:
σ2 = E(X2)− (E(X))2
σ2m+n =
1
m+ n
m+n∑
i=1
p2i − (p¯m+n)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
1
m+ n
m+n∑
i=1
p2i
σ2m =
1
m
m∑
i=1
p2i − (p¯m)2
σ2n =
1
n
m+n∑
i=m+1
p2i − (p¯n)2
m · σ2m + n · σ2n =
m+n∑
i=1
p2i −m · (p¯m)2 − n · (p¯n)2
= (m+ n) · σ2m+n −m · (p¯m)2 − n · (p¯n)2
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Hence:
σ2m+n =
m
m+ n
· σ2m +
n
m+ n
· σ2n +
m
m+ n
· (p¯m)2 +
n
m+ n
· (p¯n)2
The variance of the whole sample consists of the subgroups' weighted variances
and their weighted quadratic means.
Since m · p¯m + n · p¯n = 0, and therefore both means are either moving towards
or away from zero, we can further simplify using p¯m = − nm · p¯n:
m
m+ n
· (p¯m)2 + n
m+ n
· (p¯n)2 = m
m+ n
· (− n
m
· p¯n)2 + n
m+ n
· (p¯n)2
= (
m
m+ n
· n
2
m2
+
n
m+ n
)(p¯n)
2
=
mn2 +m2n
(m+ n)m2
(p¯n)
2
=
(m+ n)mn
(m+ n)m2
(p¯n)
2
=
n
m
(p¯n)
2
Thus:
σ2m+n =
m
m+ n
σ2m +
n
m+ n
σ2n +
n
m
(p¯n)
2,
or equivalently
σ2m+n =
m
m+ n
σ2m +
n
m+ n
σ2n +
m
n
(p¯m)
2.
Expressed in changes and adding the product group index k, we get:
∆σ2k,m+n =
n
m+ n
∆σ2k,m +
n
m+ n
∆σ2k,n +
n
m
∆(p¯k,n)
2
Finally, we aggregate over all product groups k:
∆σ2m+n =
1
K
K∑
k=1
σ2k,m+n =
m
m+ n
∆σ2m +
n
m+ n
∆σ2n +
n
m
1
K
K∑
k=1
∆(p¯k,n)
2
In the EU23 case with K = 34 product groups:
∆σ2k,EU23 =
15
23
∆σ2k,EU15 +
8
23
∆σ2k,EU8 +
8
15
∆(p¯k,EU8)
2
∆σ2EU23 =
15
23
∆σ2EU15 +
8
23
∆σ2EU8 +
8
15
1
34
34∑
k=1
∆(p¯k,EU8)
2
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A.1.2 Conﬁdence Intervalls
For better readability, here we use pt = 134
∑34
k=1 ∆p¯
2
k,EU8,t
Table A.1: Paired t-test and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for pt
Period N pt−1 pt ∆pt 815∆pt t [99% C.I.] of ∆pt z
2001-2003 34 0.1001 0.1217 0.0216 0.0115 -3.4388 - 0.0388 - 0.0044 - 3.1200
2003-2006 34 0.1217 0.0792 - 0.0425 - 0.0227 7.656 - 0.0273 - 0.0577 4.8640
2006-2009 34 0.0792 0.0481 - 0.0311 - 0.0166 5.5055 - 0.0157 - 0.0466 4.9150
2003-2009 34 0.1217 0.0481 - 0.0736 - 0.0394 8.6095 - 0.0503 - 0.0970 5.0860
The table presents the results of the paired t-test and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test
for pt. Both tests show signiﬁcance at the 99% level. t is the t statistic of the paired t-test z is the
z statistic of the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. The conﬁdence interval of pt has been
calculated based on the paired t-test.
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 3
A.2.1 A comparison of professional and non professional sex
workers
On www.gesext.de not only professional sex workers oﬀer services, but also non-
professional ones (claiming to oﬀer services only occasionally and for whom sex
work is not their main source of income). This is a group of sex workers, which is
uncovered in nearly all other data sets on sex work, but which makes up a large part
of our data: 27.2% of the 102.096 oﬀers have been made by a woman that claims to
be a non-professional seller (1355 out of 4070 sellers).
In general, at the time of making the contract the potential customer does not
know if the claim is true and neither do we, when one can only look at self descrip-
tions of the sellers. In this data set the sellers' ratings are close to 100%, which might
indicate that after having met the sellers, customers seem to be convinced that the
information they were given  including the claim to be a non-professional seller 
was valid. However, this cannot be tested. In general, if the information was worth-
less it would not be worth mentioning. As there is no other data set able to compare
these sub-groups, we use the dummy variable seller claims to be no professional sex
worker to create two subsamples and compare them. So what we actually are able to
look at are two things: 1) If sellers that claim to be non-professionals have diﬀerent
attributes and oﬀer diﬀerent services, and 2) if customers value services oﬀered by
these non-professional sellers at diﬀerent prices.
Figure A.1: Maps: Non professional sex workers
Sex work in Germany at the 2 digit zip code level. Darker colors represent higher values of the
variable in the given region. Source: Own representation.
(a) Share of non-professional sellers per zip
code area and ﬁgure
(b) Share of oﬀers made by non-professional
sellers per zipcode area.
Figures A.1a and A.1b show how high the percentage of non-professional sellers
and the percentage of oﬀers made by them is in each 2 digit zip code. In the areas
marked dark red this percentage is higher than 40% and 31% respectively, with
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the maximum of 75% non-professional sellers and 91% non-professionally oﬀered
services in Suhl (D-98). Nearly all of the dark red areas are rural areas and in
most cities the share of non-professional sellers and oﬀers is close to the average of
27.2% and 33.4%. However, there are also many rural areas with few or even no
non-professional sellers. There seems to be no clear pattern.
When looking at attributes of the sellers and services oﬀered, some diﬀerences
appear.1 First of all, non-professional sellers put more eﬀort into their self descrip-
tions. The average text length is 85 words longer for non-professional sellers (252
words in total) and there are less misspellings per word. This could be partly due to
a higher educational status of the non-professional sellers: 14% of them claim to be
students, while no seller in the other subsample makes this claim. The longer free
texts result in information on personal attributes such as height, weight, age, etc.
being speciﬁed more often. Interestingly, on average these personal attributes are
very similar to the ones of non-professional sellers. The latter just weigh a bit more
(70 kg, BMI 24.7 vs. for non-professional vs. 63 kg, BMI 22.9 for professionals),
claim less often to be single (10% vs. 30%) and more often to have a partner (8%
vs. 4%). On the pictures non-professional sellers are more often naked (10.2% vs.
7.2%), but show their face less often (18.0%, vs. 27.5%). This is unsurprising, as
non-professional sellers have more to loose if they are recognized by other people,
but 18% is still a high share.
When we look at sold prices, per sale non-professionals earn more money than
professionals, but this can be explained by non-professional sellers oﬀering slightly
diﬀerent services. The diﬀerence in hourly wages for the same service is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (e.g., 101.20 euro vs. 100.80 euro for vaginal sex). Non-professional
sellers oﬀer longer sessions (3.1 vs. 2.7 hours) and less often only massages, manual
or oral stimulation (6.8% vs. 15.3%), but rather vaginal sex. Professional sellers
make up part of this by oﬀering more unprotected (5.7% vs. 6.7%) and anal sex
(14.9% vs. 16.9%). In total, the average professional seller earns 30 euro less per
sale than a non-professional one, but the ﬁrst group makes up for this by oﬀering
services more often (8.6 vs. 7.2 sold services per seller). Finally, when looking at the
location the meeting will take place, non-professional sellers oﬀer less often to meet
at their own homes and more often at the seller's home or a hotel. Again, this is
unsurprising as non-professional sellers might want to protect their "moonlighting"
from neighbors and friends and might not have enough customers to aﬀord renting
a second location, as professional sellers might do.
When looking at the customers side, only four percent of the men that have
bought at least one service from a non-professional seller bought all other services
from a non-professional seller as well. Hence, most of them do not have a preference
for one of the two groups. To sum up, these two groups diﬀer, but not too much.
1Statistical signiﬁcances in this paragraph have been tested by using unpaired t-tests. Unless
stated otherwise, results are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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A.3 Appendix for Chapter 6
A.3.1 RDD: General Methodology
First, denote a generic outcome for unit i by yi and a continuous so-called forcing
variable di ∈ (−∞,∞)  distance to the internal East-West border  which displays
a continuous impact on outcome and determines where the internal border is, at
which outcome may be discontinuous. For convenience, use di ∈ (−∞, 0) in the
West and di ∈ [0,∞) in the East and deﬁne the binary variable easti = 1 if di ≥ 0
and easti = 0 if di < 0. Second, deﬁne two ﬂexible and smooth (e.g., polynomial)
functions about di at di < 0 and di ≥ 0 as
f0 (di) at easti = 0, f1 (di) at easti = 1, and f
∗
1 (di) ≡ f1 (di)− f0(di)
Then, the conditional expectations of outcome yi may be speciﬁed as
E [yi|yidi, easti = 0] = α + f0(di) (A.1)
E [yi|yidi, easti = 1] = α + f0(di) + LATEeast + f ∗1 (di) (A.2)
Where LATEeast is the local average treatment eﬀect of interest. Technically,
LATEeast ≡ lim
∆→0
(E [yi | 0 < di < ∆]− E [yi | −∆ < di < 0]) . (A.3)
For a further discussion of an RDD, see Imbens & Lemieux (2008) as well as
Lee & Lemieux (2010). In the approach pursued here, we present two types of
results: one is based on the main eﬀect, assuming homogeneity of LATEeast across
all places along the border, and an alternative one permits LATEeast to vary with
log population and, to permit for a further discontinuity, with Berlin.
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